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John J. Costonis1   
© 2011 
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1 Chancellor Emeritus and Judge Albert Tate and Rosemary Neal Hawkland 
Professor of Law. My gratitude to colleagues Patrick Martin, John Devlin and Ed 
Richards for commenting on the themes developed in this paper, to LSU Law Center 
Librarian Beth Williams and the Library staff for their invaluable bibliographic 
assistance, and to the LSU Law Center Summer Research program for its financial 
support. 
2 Roger North, quoted in 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 558 n.2 (3rd ed 
1927). 
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I. Introduction 
 
 The “saltier” a dispute, the greater the confidence with which admiralty 
judges pronounce it appropriate for their attention. Was the discharge from the 
Macondo well blowout3, only six ten-thousandths of which may have been salty, 
salty enough to warrant the inclusion within admiralty jurisdiction of the economic 
losses it generated. Or was it rather a pinch of salt in an oily stew?   
 
The reference, of course, is to the well blowout and fire in April 20, 2010, 
which discharged an estimated 700 barrels of oil from the Deepwater Horizon as 
against some 4.9 million barrels from BP’s Macondo well4, a designated situs under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act5  (OCSLA). To some, a claim of sufficient 
saltiness given these numbers might call to mind Justice Harlan’s plaint in a different 
context that “whenever a maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or 
marginal, it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing or significant.”6 
 
Whatever its saltiness quotient, the blowout is first, foremost, and last an 
environmental/pollution control event. In fact, it is the dreaded focus of at least 
three federal environmental pollution control measures –OCSLA, the Oil 
                                                        
 3 For a detailed account of the Macondo blowout, see National Commission on the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deepwater: The Gulf Oil 
Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (2011) [hereinafter President’s Report]. 
4 See id. at 130 (Deepwater Horizon discharge); id. at 167 (Macondo oil discharge). 
5 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953), (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356(a)(2006) & Supp. III 2009)[hereinafter OCSLA].  
6 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961).  
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PollutionAct of 1990 (OPA)7, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.8 One or 
more of these statutes has engaged Congress since 1948. All have taxed the 
scientific, rule-making and regulatory capabilities of scores of federal agencies ever 
since.  OCSLA and the FWPCA have been pervasively reworked9, moreover, in 
Congress’s struggle  to stay apace of the astonishing technological changes of ever 
deeper and more remote OCS oil drilling and of the nation’s shift from pre-1970’s 
environmental neglect to the often dystopian pessimism of the post-1970 era.   
 
Following the 1969 Santa Barbara OCS blowout, these legislative efforts have 
proceeded alongside an expanding network of other federal non-admiralty 
environmental measures that often engage hybrid ocean/land venues or ocean 
venues alone.10 But the initial stages of the Macondo Multi-District Litigation11 
signal reluctance to take seriously Senator Edward Muskie’s summary of the driving 
force behind OCSLA’s 1978 amendments:  “[E]xploration, development and 
production activities on the Outer Continental Shelf are no different than any other 
source of pollution.”12 
 
A. The Macondo Blowout as an Admiralty Tort 
 
Master complaints and motions supporting and opposing dismissal in the 
Macondo Multidistrict Litigation suggest that OPA and admiralty law –its 
substantive rules as well as its procedures—may overwhelm OCSLA in the search 
for rules and procedures governing the blowout’s economic losses.13  Indicative as 
well is the decision of presiding Eastern Federal District of Louisiana Judge Barbier  
                                                        
7 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended 
at 33 U.S.C. 2701-2761 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)[hereinafter OPA]. 
8 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat 1155 (1948) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1376 (2006 & Supp. 2009).  
9 OCSLA, which has been significantly amended twice since its adoption in 1953, will 
be referred to in text as OCSLA ’53, OCSLA ’78, and OCSLA ’90 to correspond to 
whichever of OCSLA’s three phases is under discussion in text. 
10 See infra Part III A. and Part III.B.2.  
11In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 
2010, MDL No. 2179 (Aug. 10, 2010).  
12 124 Cong. Rec. 27265 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward Muskie), debating report 
entitled Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 95-
1474 (1978).   
13 Remedies available under both OPA and OCSLA’s former title III, Pub. L. 95-372, 
92 Stat. 629, Title III, secs. 301-315 (1978) [hereinafter title III], relate exclusively to 
economic losses, not to personal injuries or death. In view of OPA’s repeal of title III 
in Pub. L. 101-380, 104 stat. 484, sec. 2004 (1990), OPA, not OCSLA, is now the 
source of economic loss remedies even if, as argued in Part IV.A., former title III 
provisions afford valuable guidance in interpreting OPA key definitional terms, the 
assessment of which is a principal object of this paper.   
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devote the first MDL trial to the Concursus Petition of Transocean,14 the Deepwater 
Horizon’s owner, under the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act.15  
 
Admiralty’s role in the controversy’s governance process should be 
addressed early on, of course, and may turn out to merit the influence that almost all 
MDL’s parties (and observers) seem eager to concede it. To them, the status of the 
blowout’s status as an admiralty tort is essentially assumed, positioning Macondo’s 
dominant issue instead as the extent to which admiralty and state law escape 
displacement or preemption under OPA’s partial preclusion clauses, sections 
2751(e) and 2718 respectively. Judge Barbier’s selection of the Concursus Petition 
may prove a brilliant stroke that expedites management of the tragedy’s actual and 
potential economic loss claims by opening the action to a larger group of parties and 
causes of action than might be possible within OPA’s narrower confines.  
 
The conventional case for admiralty jurisdiction proceeds largely, if not 
exclusively, on the premise that the Deepwater Horizon qualifies as an OPA section 
2701(37) “vessel,” which the section defines as “every description of watercraft or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on water….” This definition corresponds, it is argued, to the United 
States Supreme Court’s description of a vessel in Stewart v. Dutra Construction 
Company as “any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation 
regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment.”16  A 
creature of general maritime law, this definition has been codified for the better part 
of a century and a half.17 Within the Macondo setting, moreover, the Deepwater 
Horizon is a “vessel” engaged in exploratory drilling, an activity the Fifth Circuit has 
christened “maritime commerce.”18 The discharge of oil from a vessel into navigable 
waters has also been consecrated as a maritime tort.19 Although the Macondo well is 
a non-admiralty OCSLA situs, the movement of its oil to the high seas assures its 
                                                        
14 In re the Complaint and Petition of Triton Asset Leasing GmbH for Exoneration 
from and Limitation of Liability, Civil Action No. 4:10-CV-1721, June 23, 2010, 2010 
WL 2541825 (S.D. Tex. 2010).  
15 46 U.S.C. secs.181-189 (2000) (repealed and subsequently reenacted and codified 
as the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act at 46 U.S.C. sec. 30505 (2007)). 
16 543 US. 481, 497 (2005) (defining the term “vessel” for purposes of the 
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act, 33 U.S.C. sec. 902(3)(g) (2009)) 
[hereinafter LHWCA].  
17 Because the LHWCA lacks its own statutory definition, Dutra filled the gap by 
reference to the term’s definition in 1 U.S.C. sec. 3 (2006), which claims statutory 
provenance from the 19th Century. 
18 See Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp, 783 F.2d 538-39 (5th Cir, 1986); Pippen v. Shell 
Oil Co., 661 F. 2d 378, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1981).  
19 See In re New Jersey Barging Co., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Salaky v. Atlas 
Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), rev’d on other grounds, 208 
F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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blowout’s status as a maritime tort pursuant to OCSLA sec. 1332(2)20 under two 
earlier federal decisions.21 
 
From an admiraltycentric perspective, OCSLA plays into the jurisdictional 
discussion essentially through a single subsection, OCLSA sec. 1333(a)(2)(A).22 As 
construed in the Fifth Circuit’s dominant jurisprudence and commentary, this 
section further secures the Deepwater Horizon’s maritime status by including 
among OCSLA situses only drilling rigs that are “fixed structures.” In 1978, OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(1)23 was amended to extend federal law to “temporarily attached” 
devices, such as the Deepwater Horizon, but the amendment has not been tested in 
the context afforded by the Macondo setting.  As a movable drilling platform, 
therefore, the semisubmersible Deepwater Horizon is a “vessel” under Dutra and, it 
is presumed, OPA section 2701(37) as well. 
 
B. A Role for OCSLA’s Environmental/Public Lands Perspective?  
 
Peering at these issues through an admiralty spyglass and genuflecting 
before talismanic and, perhaps, inapt admiralty labels imprisons environmental 
purposes and interpretations relating to federal lands as strangers in their own 
home. Doing so ignores that OCSLA’s focus is Outer Continental Shelf “Lands,” not 
“Waters,” and pays no heed to the extensive scope of Congress’s power under the 
Property Clause to make “needful Rules and Regulations” respecting not only the 
public lands themselves,24 but contiguous areas, resources and appurtenances 
functionally linked to the nation’s proprietary and regulatory interests in its public 
                                                        
20 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec.1332(2)(2006) requires that the statute be interpreted “in 
such manner that the character of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf as 
high seas and the right to navigation and fishing shall not be affected.”  
21 Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Union Oil v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 
558 (9th Cir. 1974).  
22 In relevant part, the section provides that “[t]o the extent that they are applicable 
and not inconsistent with this subchapter and other Federal laws and regulations of 
the Secretary …, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State … are declared to 
be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer 
Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon….” 
23 As amended, 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1)(2006) provides in material part that the 
“Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are 
extended to the subsoil and the seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all 
artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily 
attached to the seabed which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring 
for, developing, or producing resources therefrom … to the same extent as if the 
outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within 
a state….” 
24 U.S. Const. art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), 
discussed infra Part B.2. 
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lands.25 Unwittingly perhaps, they champion a perception of OCSLA that freezes it in 
its original 1953 form. Disregarded, therefore, is Congress’s infusion into OCSLA ’78 
of pervasive environmental, pollution control and liability values,26 many of which 
remain vital elements in OCSLA ’90, the statute’s third and current phase, or may 
reasonably be employed to offer interpretative guidance for addressing elements of 
OCSLA title III that were incorporated into OPA upon the latter’s repeal of the title.27  
 
Admiraltycentic eyes also discount Macondo’s striking novelty. The fact is 
that the courts have not had occasion to construe either OCSLA ’78 or OCSLA 90 as 
sources of liability for the economic losses resulting from Macondo’s unique  setting. 
In consequence, issues as fundamental as the blowout’s status as an admiralty tort 
cannot be predicted with the assurance or, at least, guidance that would have been 
available had the issues been the subject of prior judicial scrutiny.   
 
This paper advances a legal framework for the governance of Macondo’s 
economic losses from a perspective that properly credits OCSLA’s status both as a 
non-admiralty federal public lands and environmental measure, and as the OCS’s 
parent statute.  It identifies three independently sourced elements that interact 
closely to shape the framework described in this paper. The first is the progressive 
refashioning of OCSLA over three chronological phases. The second is the Macondo 
scenario’s abrupt departure from what will be termed the “Fifth Circuit model” by 
endowing OCSLA and, in particular, OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) with a prominent 
role denied it under this model.  
 
The third is the requirement that, to qualify as an admiralty tort, the activity 
being pursued when the tortious event occurs must bear a ”substantial relationship 
to a traditional maritime activity.“ Although formally introduced by Executive Jet 
Aviation Company v. City of Cleveland,28 the “substantial relationship” requirement 
was both anticipated in and exemplified by the Supreme Court in Rodrigue v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Company.29 Executive Jet and its progeny have increasingly been 
integrated into OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) analysis, a trend this paper argues 
poses a more severe threat to Macondo’s admiralty status than the questionable 
status of the Deepwater Horizon as a “vessel.”30 The third inquiry, while valuable in 
itself, also warrants re-examination of seemingly long-settled doctrines whose 
dormant limitations surface in Macondo’s novel setting. This inquiry explores the 
doctrines’ inadequacies as a point of departure for assessing whether or not 
Macondo’s OCS drilling operations are in fact and law “substantially related to a 
traditional maritime activity.” 
                                                        
25 See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S 1007 
(1982), discussed infra Part B.2.  
26 See infra Part III.A.  
27 See infra Part IV.A. 
28 409 U.S. 249 (1972) [hereinafter Executive Jet]. 
29 395 U.S. 352 (1969) [hereinafter Rodrigue]. 
30 See infra Part III.D.3. and Part IV.B.2. 
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1. OCSLA’s Three Phases 
 
OCLSA three phases require a degree of individual and cumulative 
assessment lacking because the courts have yet to address a dispute presenting 
Macondo’s factual and legal profile. The closest litigation of record the author has 
found are two opinions, the Oppen cases,31 dealing with economic damages suffered 
in consequence of the 1969 OCS well blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel. Decided 
prior to OCSLA’s amendment in 1978 and OPA’s adoption in 1990, they have been 
overtaken by subsequent developments.32 But they do offer the provocative 
conclusions, considered presently, that OCS drilling is a non-maritime activity,33 and 
that movement of oil from an OCSLA situs to the sea above may qualify the 
discharge as an admiralty tort.34   
 
OCSLA ’53 secured the OCS against foreign and state territorial claims by 
constituting it a component of federal public lands, and authorized the Executive 
Branch to lease these lands for oil and gas production.35 Consistent with the pre-
1970’s era’s neglect of environmental values, however, OCSLA ‘53 ignored 
management of the oil drilling’s environmental consequences and the allocation of 
liability and remedies for OCS blowouts and spills.  The next 15 years witnessed a 
parade of OCS environmental disasters, the most notorious of which was the Santa 
Barbara OCS blowout.  
 
Congress introduced OCSLA’s second phase in 1978 by thoroughly rewriting 
the statute to create a “new statutory regime”36 designed to address OCSLA 53’s 
environmental voids. OCSLA ’78 expanded section 1333(a)(1)’s coverage from 
“fixed structures” to “temporarily attached” installations such as the Deepwater 
Horizon.37 Title III, OCSLA’s precursor to OPA title I, denied the latter status as 
“vessels,” a term it strictly limited to watercraft transporting oil from “offshore 
facilities.”38 Semisubmersibles, such as the Deepwater Horizon, and permanently 
attached drilling platforms alike occupied the “offshore facility” category.39 Contrary 
to the view denying the section 1333(a)(1) substantive force,40 the amendment’s 
                                                        
31 See Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Union Oil v. Oppen, 501 
F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).  
32 See infra TAN 182-93 and 217-18.  
33 Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F. 2d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 1974); Union Oil v. Oppen, 501 
F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1974)  
34 Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F2d at 256; Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 401 F.2d at 562. 
35 See infra TAN 75-77. 
36 H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1460.   
37 See infra note 181.   
38 See infra TAN note 179.   
39 See infra TAN 177-79.  
40 See infra Part II.C.1. and n. 72.  
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linkage of the section and its “temporarily attached” devices to the new title III 
confirmed the section as itself a source of federal substantive governance rules. 
 
Congress also expanded OCSLA 53’s narrow focus on worker welfare and 
events atop or concerning fixed drilling platforms –principally torts injuring 
platform workers.41 OCS oil drilling’s environmental consequences would now be 
addressed through a three-dimensional geographic/spatial model running 
horizontally from the OCS to state coastlines and inland, and vertically from OCS 
subsoil to superadjacent waters on up to the airshed above and extending well 
inland over the affected state or states.42 Among their diverse purposes, section 
1333(a)(1)’s amendment, a bevy of changes to other OCSLA ’53 provisions, and the 
addition of title III were required to implement this regional ecological model, an 
                                                        
41 This paper’s focus on the Macondo tort under the OCSLA/OPA combination 
accounts for its concentration on torts both in the Fifth Circuit model and in 
Supreme Court precedents such as Rodrigue and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 
477 U.S. 207 (1986). The Fifth Circuit model also addresses contract actions, among 
others, involving such matters as platform construction, furnishings and 
maintenance, and cross-indemnification agreements relating to employee injuries. 
The paper occasionally cites Circuit OCSLA contract cases in assessing Executive Jet’s 
substantial relationship principle. But it avoids incorporating into the Macondo tort 
discussion doctrines premised on the OCSLA contract cases. General maritime law is 
considerably more likely to preempt OCSLA-endorsed state law in OCS contract 
cases than in OCS tort cases in which the tortious event occurs on an OCSLA situs. 
This was not always so. Until 1969, the Circuit held that employee injuries resulting 
from torts atop fixed drilling platforms were governed by maritime law as 
“maritime” matters. See Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 67 (5th Cir. 
1961)(general maritime law, not OCSLA-endorsed state law applies to tortious 
personal injury atop fixed platform; “hazards and risks of injury” made regulable 
under OCSLA by the Coast Guard are “essentially maritime”).  Rodrigue objected to  
the “maritime” characterization, and the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that under 
both Rodrigue and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) the 
applicable law is likely to be determined by the situs of the tort. But the Fifth Circuit 
has ruled also post-Rodrigue that indemnity contracts relating to the same matter --
employee injuries resulting from torts atop fixed platforms--may be governed by 
general maritime law, which preempts the OCSLA alternative. See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1990); Lirette v. Popich Bros. 
Water Transport, 699 F.2d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 1983). In Grand Isle Shipyard Inc. v. 
Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009), the Circuit held that all indemnity 
contract cases triggered by platform employee personal injury or deaths should 
turn on a “focus-of-the-contract” rule, rather than on the tort-based rule stressing 
the employee’s location at the time of injury. 
42 See infra Part III A.  
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approach that has been increasingly adopted in late-20th Century public lands 
management.43  
 
OCLSA’s final (and current) phase commenced with Congress’s enactment of 
OPA ’90, which itself repealed OCSLA 78’s title III, while leaving in place both  
amended section 1333(a)(1) and the various other changes designed in part to 
implement OCSLA 78’s ecological model. The pertinent question here –again 
unaddressed in the courts, and incorporated with ambiguous brevity by 
Congress44—is the extent to which OPA itself incorporates these changes or leaves 
them intact in OCSLA as a basis for joint management of OCS blowouts and spills.   
 
2. The Fifth Circuit Model and the Macondo Scenario: A Comparison 
 
The second concern –the Macondo scenario’s novelty for the courts—
explains both the absence of judicial attention to the foregoing issues and the lack of 
fit between jurisprudence premised on the Fifth Circuit model and the demands of 
the unique Macondo scenario. As addressed in this paper, the former typically 
features a tort occurring atop or in proximity to an OCS fixed drilling platform. The 
tort usually results in injury or death to the fixed platform worker. Under section 
1333(a)(2)(A) the routine candidates for legal governance are limited either to 
admiralty law or to the OCSLA-endorsed law of the adjoining state, with federal law, 
other than admiralty law, rarely entering the picture. OCSLA’s preference for the law 
of “each adjacent state” seeks to protect platform workers injured atop fixed 
platforms who, as likely residents of the adjacent state, will be better served by their 
state’s legal regimes than by general maritime law.45 
 
In its vertical relationship with state law, (federal) admiralty law, under Fifth 
Circuit jurisprudence addressed presently,46 will almost certainly prevail over 
conflicting OCSLA-endorsed state law in a section 1333(a)(2)(A) contest in which 
admiralty jurisdiction is engaged. Discarding Congressional intent as transparently 
expressed in OCSLA’s legislative history and recited by the Supreme Court in 
Rodrigue,47 the Circuit reasons that events that, pre-OCSLA, qualified as admiralty 
                                                        
43 See generally Christine Klein, Federico Cheever & Bret Birdsong, Natural 
Resources Law: A Place-Based Book of Problems and Cases (2009). 
44 OPA Subchapter I mentions the OCS at only two points, one in 33 U.S.C. sec. 
2701(25) (West. Supp. 2010)’s provocative, if laconic, definition of  “Outer 
Continental Shelf offshore facility,” and the other in 33 U.S.C. sec. 2703(c)(3) (West. 
Supp.), denying these facilities a financial cap for response cost liability.  
45 See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra note 119. 
47 In Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F. 2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992) overruled on other 
grounds, Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC,  589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 
2009), the court conceded that the Fifth Circuit’s “case law arguably conflicts with 
OCSLA. As explained in Rodrigue, Congress intended that, after passage of OCSLA, 
the oil and gas exploration industries would be governed by [OCSLA-endorsed] state 
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events remain such post-OCSLA, and are deemed to “apply of their own force.”48 
Reinforcing this outcome is the section’s bar against the application of state law that 
is “inconsistent” with “other Federal laws,” the latter regarded as including these 
admiralty rules that apply “of their own force.” From this reasoning follows an 
additional rule securing admiralty law’s dominance: when admiralty and OCSLA 
jurisdiction overlap, state law must yield to the former.49 The displacement of 
OCSLA jurisdiction seals the victory for admiralty50 since “with admiralty 
jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”51  
 
The Macondo scenario departs sharply from this model.  Although it too 
entails a tort, its consequences issue as an economic loss, not personal injury or 
death. Macondo’s engagement with two non-admiralty federal statutes produces a 
variety of further departures. OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) specifically extends the 
“laws … of the United States” to OCSLA situses.52 There can be no doubt that OCSLA 
                                                                                                                                                                     
law [pursuant to OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006)].” Id. at 460. A candid 
portrayal of the manner by which the Circuit has sidestepped Congressional intent 
appears in Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp 836 F. Supp. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1993), which 
declares that the “legislative history of [OCSLA] clearly shows that Congress 
intended to preempt the application of maritime law to activities on platforms on 
the OCS [citing Rodrigue]. ” Id. at 414.  Dissonance within the Fifth Circuit, however, 
appears in Judge Politz’s ruling that “[a]s the Supreme Court made abundantly clear 
in Rodrigue …, Congress intended that the law of the adjacent state would become 
surrogate on fixed platforms on the Shelf to the exclusion of rules of admiralty and 
common law.” Matte v. Zapata Offshore Co., 784 F.2d 628, 630 (5th Cir. 1986).  
48 Circuit opinions premise this reasoning on two elements. The situses Congress 
brought under the coverage of OCSLA ’53 –principally permanently attached 
platforms, their appurtenances and the OCS subsoil, seabed and natural resources --
would not engage admiralty jurisdiction under traditional admiralty principles. In 
one of its dimensions moreover, Rodrigue favored OCSLA-endorsed state law on the 
basis that, admiralty jurisdiction being inapplicable independently of OCSLA, failed 
to apply “of its own force.” Rodrigue at 355, 366. The Circuit also reasons that the 
reverse of this proposition is equally true: when independently of OCSLA, admiralty 
law, traditionally considered, would have applied of its own force, it forms a part of 
43 U.S.C. section 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006)’s “other Federal laws” with which the 
OCSLA-endorsed state law is “inconsistent,” and hence disqualified from service as 
surrogate federal law. 
49 See, e.g., Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1988); Laredo 
Offshore Constructors Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1985).  
50 See Hufnagel v. Omega Services Indus., Inc. 182 F.3rd 340, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 
grounds, Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009); 
Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d at 1229, 1230-32 (5th Cir. 
1985).  
51 East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica v. Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). 
52 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006). See infra Part II.C.1.  
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and OPA, as a successor to title III, are applicable “laws … of the United States.”  
Congress tailored them precisely to fix liability for economic loss resulting from 
discharges on the OCS under OCSLA title III and, subsequently under OPA, both on 
the OCS and within territorial seas.  
 
The relationship between section 1333(a)(1)’s governing non-admiralty 
federal statutory law and general maritime law therefore, reverses the relationship 
between section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s state law and general maritime law. In the event of 
conflict, maritime law, which preempts state law under the latter section, is 
displaced by non-admiralty federal law under section 1333(a)(1).53 Consequently, 
claims that OCSLA-endorsed law must yield to admiralty law in the event of 
overlapping jurisdiction, that admiralty law “applying by its own force” overrides its 
competitor, or that admiralty jurisdiction necessarily requires the application of 
admiralty substantive state law are inapposite in the Macondo setting.  
  
Among the most conspicuous differences between the two models are those 
relating to their respective spatial/geographic ranges. The Fifth Circuit’s tort model 
goes no further than accidents directly atop or in close proximity to fixed drilling 
structures.54 Section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s preference for adjoining state law, as noted, 
aligns with OCSLA ‘53’s solicitude for platform workers and their families, most of 
whom, Congress assumed, would be residents of adjacent states.55 OCSLA ’78 
occupies another dimension altogether that reaches from OCS subsoil to airshed and 
from OCS to coastline and inland to fulfill OCSLA ‘78’s commitment to insure the 
environmental integrity of an entire region. 
 
                                                        
53 In East River S.S. Corp v. Transamerica v. Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986), 
the Supreme Court was careful to state that it is only in the absence of an 
intervening federal non-admiralty statute that “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes 
the application of substantive admiralty law.“ The force of Delaval’s caveat bites 
hard if the latter is judge-made general maritime law since neither judge-made 
common law nor general maritime law fare well in contests with competing federal 
statutes. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-19 (1981) (federal 
common law of maritime pollution displaced by FWPCA which “speaks directly” to 
the issue); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 
U.S. 1, 11-15(1981) (same); In re Oswego Barge Corp, 664 F.2d 327, 337-38 (2nd Cir. 
1981) ( federal statutes presumptively displace general maritime law, particularly if 
they “speak directly” to the matter at hand); cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport 
Workers Union AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 96 (1981)(“[E[ven in admiralty … where the 
federal judiciary’s lawmaking power may well be at its strongest, it is the Court’s 
duty to respect the will of Congress.”).  
54 75 feet from platform to accident appears to be the furthest the Fifth Circuit has 
been willing to go in selecting OCSLA-endorsed state tort law. See Dearborn Marine 
Service, Inc. v. Chambers & Kennedy, 499 F.2d 263 (5th Circuit 1974) (fireball from 
platform incinerated a service vessel moored to it by a 75-foot rope).   
55 See infra TAN 95-97.  
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3. Rodrigue: Interpreting OCSLA and Anticipating Executive Jet 
 
 The United States Supreme Court decided Rodrigue in 1969, 16 years after 
the passage of OCSLA ‘53 and three years prior to the Court’s decision in Executive 
Jet. These cases are woven into the paper’s narrative because they pose in sweeping 
terms the question dealt with more concretely to this point: why worry about 
qualifying a matter as appropriate for admiralty jurisdiction, substantive rules and 
procedures at all?   
 
One response is because the Supreme Court worries about the issue and, in 
at least two key decisions, one being Rodrigue, firmly declared Fifth Circuit 
jurisprudence overly protective of its admiralty jurisdiction within the OCS 
operations setting.56 In fact, the Supreme Court’s recognition that OCSLA is hostile to 
admiralty law’s claim to govern OCS oil and gas drilling operations runs throughout 
its OCSLA jurisprudence. The Court stated in Rodrigue that “[t]he bill [that became 
OCSLA] applied the same law to the seabed and subsoil as well as to artificial 
islands, and admiralty law was obviously unsuited to that task.”57 It reaffirmed in 
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire58 that  “admiralty jurisdiction generally should 
not be extended to accidents in areas covered by OCSLA.” Most pointedly, it rejected 
the claim that “comprehensive admiralty remedies apply under [OCSLA Sec.] 
1333(a)(1),” in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,59 declaring instead that OCSLA “ousts 
admiralty law and specifically directs that state law shall be adopted as federal law.”60  
 
Another reason is fidelity to Congressional intent. Congress enjoys plenary 
power over public lands under the property clause, among other non-admiralty 
constitutional clauses that ground OCSLA. In the maritime pollution field, it has long 
since overtaken judge-made common law- and general maritime law-making in this 
complex endeavor.61 Special deference is owed to Congress’s role when the matter 
                                                        
56 The other is Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1986), which is discussed 
infra Part II.D.3. 
57 Rodrigue at 364.  
58 477 U.S. 207, 218 (1986). 
59 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971).  
60 Id. at 105, n. 8 (emphasis added). Huson is the most explicitly hostile of the 
opinions referenced in text. In response to the Circuit’s effort to fill a section 
1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) gap with a federal common law remedy that duplicated an 
admiralty rule, the Court reversed the Circuit on the ground that it was seeking “to 
reintroduce [an admiralty] doctrine through a back door,” an approach the Court 
complained that “subverts the Congressional intent documented in Rodrigue … that 
admiralty doctrines should not apply under the Lands Act.” Id. at 104 (emphasis 
added).  
61 The disinclination and, indeed, inability of the courts to take on these burdens is 
the overriding message of the cases cited supra n. 53. For a detailed account of 
progressively complex engagement of federal statutory law and federal agencies in 
the maritime pollution sphere, see President’s Report chs. 7-10; Lawrence Kiern, 
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in question is amenable to governance under various constitutional powers other 
than62 or, in the case of the OCS’s comprehensive governance, in opposition to the 
admiralty clause.  Congress’s choices, first, to frame a statute comprehensively 
governing OCS matters under its interstate commerce, property and other non-
admiralty clause powers, and, second, expressly to eschew the admiralty clause for 
this role in the proceedings leading to OCSLA ‘53’s adoption are not easily 
accommodated with choosing admiralty law as the default law for matters that fell 
within its purview pre-OCSLA. 
 
Rodrigue merits attention independently of this larger question, of course, 
given its iconic interpretation of OCSLA’s text. Construing the latter in the context 
afforded by the Fifth Circuit model, it held that the law applicable under section 
1333(2)(a) to the negligently caused deaths of two fixed drilling platform workers 
was OCSLA-endorsed adjacent state law, not general maritime law. The decision 
reversed the contrary view of the Fifth Circuit, which erred on the side of generously 
construing admiralty’s reach by viewing the OCS oil production efforts as inherently 
maritime in character.63 The Fifth Circuit response, as earlier noted, crippled OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s threat to admiralty jurisdiction by concluding that 
notwithstanding the statute, matters within admiralty’s traditional sphere override 
state law by continuing to apply “of their own force.” 
 
The evident tension between the two tribunals finds further expression in 
the Supreme Court’s Executive Jet decision, which it further refined during OCSLA’s 
second and third OCSLA phases.64 Executive Jet is nothing if not a bold decision that 
has proven unsettling to the admiralty pantheon’s guardians.65 It opens an 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Liability, Compensation, Financial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 Tul. Mar. L. J. 451, Parts III-VI (2000).  
62 Judge Rubin has observed that OCSLA “depends on national sovereignty and the 
commerce clause; the cause of action it creates is one arising out of a general federal 
statute, and federal court jurisdiction depends on the existence of a federal 
question.” Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1107 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1982). 
63 Rodrigue reversed two Fifth Circuit opinions, Dore v. The Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d 
671 (5th Cir. 1068) and Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 F.2d 216 (5th 
Circuit 1968). The leading Fifth Circuit pre-Rodrigue opinion on the matter is Pure 
Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).  
64 Executive Jet ’s progeny in order of appearance are Foremost Ins. Co. v. 
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1989); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990); and Jerome B. 
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, 512 U.S. 527 (1995) 
[hereinafter Grubart]. 
65 See, e.g., Robert Pelz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 
103, 109 (1996) (substantial relationship test creates “inability to agree on 
boundaries of maritime jurisdiction --much less to fashion a workable test”); David 
Robertson & Michael Sturley, The Admiralty Extension Act Solution, 34 J. Mar. L. & 
Com. 209, 212-23(substantial relationship test replaces a “simple and predictable 
rule for determining admiralty tort jurisdiction” with “rococo judicial doctrine”).  
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alternative route to implement the vision of OCSLA’s legislative history championed 
in Rodrigue that cannot be nullified by the combined “application of its own force” 
and “inconsistent with other Federal laws” devices. 
 
Executive Jet’s goal is to align the choice of admiralty jurisdiction with subject 
matter appropriate for admiralty’s procedures and substantive rules. A proper fit, in 
Executive Jet’s formulation, requires that the pursuit giving rise to the action bear a 
“significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity.”66 The linkage is intended 
to bar the assignment of admiralty jurisdiction to a matter that is “only fortuitously 
and incidentally connected to navigable waters and … bears no relationship to 
traditional maritime activities.”67 
 
 Executive Jet’s rationale is rooted in Justice Holmes’s demystifying 
recognition a half century earlier that admiralty law is not a “corpus juris,” but a 
“very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea.”68 Admiralty rules, 
remedies and procedures are appropriate if the object of the litigation falls within 
the ambit of these customs and ordinances.69 But the contrary applies if the object 
falls outside of that circle, or, again, “is only fortuitously and incidentally connected 
to …traditional maritime activities.”70 
 
The Court rested the admiralty jurisdiction limitation on its general maritime 
law-making power, rather than on the demands of a non-admiralty or other external 
statute or requirement. A matter barred by the principle, therefore, cannot be 
revived by recourse to section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s “of its own force” or inconsistent 
with “other Federal laws” devices because the matter’s admiralty identity, if it ever 
had one, is simply expunged. Executive Jet did not arise under OCSLA. But its 
progressive integration into section 1333(a)(2)(A) analysis71 as an antidote to these 
                                                        
66 Executive Jet at 269. 
67 Id, at 273. 
68 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 235 (1917) (Holmes J., dissenting). 
69 Hence, Executive Jet’s observation that  
[t]hrough long experience, the law of the sea knows how to determine 
whether  a particular ship is seaworthy, and it knows the nature of 
maintenance and cure. It is concerned with maritime liens, the general 
average, capture and prizes, limitation of liability, cargo damage and claims 
for salvage.  
Executive Jet at 270.   
70 Id. at 273. 
71 See, e.g., Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n Inc . v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., 
448 F.3rd 760, 770-71 (5th Cir. 2006), amended on rehearing, Texaco Explor’n & 
Prod’n Inc v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., 453 F.3rd 652 (5th Cir. 2006); cert. 
denied, AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc. v. Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n, Inc., 549 
U.S. 1053, (2006) [hereinafter AmClyde]; ; Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. American 
International Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, AMF 
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devices accords OCSLA’s legislative history a level of influence that the Fifth Circuit 
has otherwise chosen to deny it.   
 
C. A  Framework for Assessing OCSLA’s Role in the Macondo Blowout Litigation  
  
The opening paragraphs identify four issues that call into question the 
Macondo’s blowout’s status as an admiralty tort. Insistence that Macondo does not 
merit this status, however, is neither the paper’s goal nor its burden. Placing the 
question within a framework that honors Macondo’s essentially environmental and 
public lands character is. The paper seeks to position the question where it belongs 
by eschewing a myopic splitting of hairs over the “vessel” issue, conceived in 
isolation from this framework, in favor of an inquiry in which this and several other 
issues cede to OCSLA the role it merits as the OCS’s parent law.  
 
 Linking the four issues in their shared relation to this inquiry frames the 
manner in which the paper will proceed. The first (the “Rodney Dangerfield issue”) 
is the role and reach of OCSLA section 1333(a)(1). Is this section undeserving of a 
role beyond merely proclaiming federal “sovereignty” 72 over the OCS, or does it 
merit the respect due a versatile provision custom-rebuilt in OCSLA ’78 to 
quarterback OCSLA’s and, derivatively perhaps, OPA’s management of the economic 
consequences of the Macondo well blowout? Aside from its role within OCSLA as 
such, does the section weaken the claim that OCS drilling is substantially related to a 
traditional maritime activity under Executive Jet?  
 
The second (the “Talisman  Issue”) is the Deepwater Horizon’s status: 
“temporarily attached” device, “vessel,” “MODU,” “offshore facility,” “Outer 
Continental Shelf facility,” or some combination of the foregoing?  
 
The third (the “Gusher Issue”) is whether Macondo oil, which is “non-
admiralty” at the OCS point of discharge, engages admiralty jurisdiction upon its 
contact with superadjacent waters. The answer was affirmative in the Oppen Santa 
Barbara blowout opinions, which were written prior to OCSLA ’78 and OPA ’90. This 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Tuboscope, Inc. v. Houston Oil & Minerals Corp., 484 U.S. 1067 (1988). AmClyde is 
discussed infra Part IV.B.2.  
72 Professor David Robertson claims that the term “jurisdiction” in section 
1333(a)(1) (2006) means “sovereignty,” and that the section’s purpose is merely “to 
assert the federal government's exclusive dominion-- exclusive of any claims of 
other countries and exclusive of any state claims-- over the resources beneath the 
outer Continental Shelf.” Mistakes at 456. He also asserts that Congress’s purpose in 
substituting the phrase “temporarily attached” devices for “fixed structures” in 
OCSLA ’78 was merely to broaden sec. 1333(a)(1)(2006) in order to assure 
exclusive “national dominion over all of the types of apparatus that are used for 
exploiting the outer Shelf's mineral resources.” Id. at 498. For a different view of 
these two matters premised on a detailed evaluation of their legislative history, see 
infra Part II.C.1. and Part III 3.C.1, respectively. 
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question primes an inquiry into OCSLA ’53’s provision denying any impact on the 
“character of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf as high seas. ”73  It also 
engages subsequent shifts, first, in the international community’s view of the 
legitimacy of littoral states’ OCS sanitary and pollution regulation and, second, the 
addition to OCSLA’s ‘53’s narrow top-of-the-platform perspective of OCSLA ‘78’s 
ecological region focus.   
 
The final question (the “Alien Issue”) steps outside of OCSLA, while 
nonetheless actively drawing upon insights afforded by the three prior issues.  
Following the Executive Jet line of decisions, it asks whether or not the OCS drilling 
activities giving rise to the Macondo well blowout are sufficiently proximate to 
traditional maritime pursuits to avoid alienage from admiralty jurisdiction.  
 
To facilitate following the course of each inquiry in chronological time, a brief 
“scorecard” is inserted following each phase.  
 
 Each topic is independent of the other.  Separately addressing each, however, 
would require constant repetition of and backtracking among differing statutory 
texts, time periods, cases and judicial venues. The framework adopted here tracks 
the influence of chronology, legislative history, and Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit 
case law on the evolution of each issue as well on the ultimate convergence of 
Rodrigue and Executive Jet in ascribing content to the “substantial relationship” 
construct.74 The framework also demonstrates the influence of long-standing, 
seemingly settled doctrines on choices concerning Macondo’s governance, and the 
necessity of assessing each inquiry both in isolation from and in complex interaction 
with the other three inquiries. 
 
II: OCSLA Phase 1: OCSLA ’53 to ‘77 
 
 Through OCSLA, Congress implemented President Truman’s 1945 
Proclamation75 bringing the resources of the OCS under the exclusive control and 
jurisdiction of the United States federal government, and authorized the Department 
of the Interior to award OCS oil and gas leases to qualified bidders. Commencing 
with its declaration in Rodrigue that OCSLA “define[s] a body of law applicable to the 
seabed, the subsoil and the … structures … on the Outer Continental shelf,”76 the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that OCSLA is the OCS’s parent law.77 
 
                                                        
73 OCSLA 43 US.C. sec. 1332(2) (2006).  
74 Judicial decisions rendered subsequent in time to the phase being discussed are 
occasionally considered when doing so produces clarity or brevity. 
75 Truman Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg.13,303, Sep, 28, 1945; Exec. Order 
No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305, 1945 WL 3400 (Sep. 28, 1945). 
76 Rodrigue at 356.  
77 See infra TAN 57-60. 
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OCSLA covers an area of approximately 890,000 square miles off the coasts 
of the 48 lower states and Alaska.78 OCSLA’s roots reach to the interstate and foreign 
commerce clause79 and to Congress’s authority under the property clause to 
“dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
the Property belonging the United States.”80 Congress’s insistence that OCS 
jurisdiction vest solely in the federal government to the exclusion of the states and 
of foreign nations speaks not only to its proprietary and trusteeship obligations, but 
to the OCS’s significance in federal spheres as varied as national defense, the 
national economy, federal revenue generation, and the conduct of international 
relations. Conspicuous for its absence from this list is the admiralty clause. Not only 
did Congress eschew reliance on the admiralty clause as OCSLA’s foundational 
source,81 moreover, but the Supreme Court has recurringly mirrored Congress’s 
discomfort with admiralty law’s fitness to govern OCS regulatory and proprietary 
functions.82 
 
 Among the many issues posed by OCSLA ‘53’s adoption, the following three 
merit attention in this paper:  
 
1. Threading the needle: establishing the federal claim to OCS jurisdiction and 
control without compromising freedom of navigation and fishing on the seas above 
the OCS. In pursuing both goals, did Congress exclude OCSLA’s application to 
superadjacent waters, thereby resolving the Gusher Issue in favor of admiralty 
jurisdiction, at least under the 1953 measure? 
    
2. Department of the Interior (DOI) Discretion: defining the purpose and scope 
of the DOI’s authority to conduct the OCS leasing program. In failing to address 
OCS’s oil drilling’s environmental dimension, does OCSLA ’53 deny itself the support 
of a property clause predicate for a rationale that includes within the statute’s 
coverage seas impacted by OCS oil drilling discharges?  
 
3. Choice of law to govern OCS drilling activities; gap-filling in the absence of 
federal law: identifying the governance system for qualified OCS situses and 
activities from among federal admiralty law, federal non-admiralty law and state 
law; and filling the gap, if any, created by the absence of applicable non-admiralty 
federal law by selecting either admiralty/general maritime law or OCSLA-endorsed 
state law serving as surrogate federal law. Congressional treatment of this group of 
concerns commences the process of addressing various dimensions of all four 
issues. Congress was still at work on this process during OCSLA’s third phase. 
Macondo will likely tack a fourth phase of unpredictable dimension on the prior 
three. 
                                                        
78 H.R. Rep. No. 83-413, at 2 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2178.  
79 See supra note 62.  
80 See U.S. Const. art. 4, sec. 3, cl. 2 discussed infra TAN 149 and Part III.B.2.  
81 See infra Part II.C.2.  
82  See supra cases cited supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.  
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A. Threading the Needle: OCSLA section 1332(2) 
 
 This issue is less significant in the present context for the underlying 
problem it presents --preventing other nations from pointing to OCSLA to justify 
undue claims for their OCS areas-- than for the implications of its solution for the 
Gusher Issue. The view of the Santa Barbara Oppen opinions that migration converts 
the discharge into an admiralty tort appears to receive support from OCSLA section 
1332(2), which provides that OCSLA “shall be construed in such a manner that the 
character of the waters above the high seas and the right to navigation and fishing 
therein shall not be affected.” To like effect is State Department testimony offered or 
referenced throughout the hearings process that 
  
[t]he character as high seas of the waters above the Continental Shelf 
remain[s] unaffected by the assertion or exercise of jurisdiction and control 
over its resources. And consequently, rights to free navigation in and fishing 
on such waters remain also unaffected.”83 
 
 Despite these passages, Congress did not relinquish its power to regulate 
activities on the high seas as manifested, for example, in its traditional application of 
admiralty law to them.84 Three levels of federal engagement were distinguished in 
the hearings: outright sovereignty, jurisdiction and control, and regulation. OCSLA 
‘53’s legislative history makes clear that Congress stopped short of claiming the 
first, even for OCS situses.85 It claimed the second over OCSLA-declared OCS situses 
                                                        
83 Outer Continental Shelf: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 573(1953) [hereinafter Insular Hearings] (statement of 
Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State). 
84 Senate Committee member Watkins stated that the “entire theory of the draft is 
that maritime law will apply, that is, by special provision in this Act to distinguish 
[this Act] from the maritime law which will be in effect on the water itself.” Insular 
Hearings at 23. The same view was expressed throughout the hearings. See, e.g., id. 
at 597 (Senator Daniels), id. at 642 (Senator Condon), and id. at 668-69 (Richard 
Young, Esq., Member of the New York State Bar). . 
85 Senator Price Daniel of Texas, asserted that the bill stopped short of declaring full 
“sovereignty” over the OCS and the superadjacent column as England had done. 
“You have to look at [the jurisdiction and control claimed in OCSLA section 1332(1) 
(2006)] as a certain amount of sovereignty from the seabed down. It is not complete 
sovereignty because we make no claim from there up into the water or airspace.” 
Insular Hearings at 21. Similar caution in dealing with the sovereignty appears in 
United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (S.D. Fla. 1970) in which the United States declined 
to assert “title” to semi-submerged OCS islands from which it sought to eject private 
parties.  OCSLA too stops short of claiming title: Section 1332(1) (2006)provides 
that the “subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United 
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control and power of disposition….” 
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and resources, but to dispel concern over any possible incursion on freedom or 
navigation, it asserted, through Senator Condon, the bill’s presenter of S. Bill 1901 in 
the Senate, the intent to limit OCSLA’s jurisdiction and control to only a “horizontal” 
regime that encompasses the OCS’s subsoil, seabed and natural resources as a single 
tranche.86  
 
Congress adopted section 1332(2), in short, to prevent other nations from 
impeding freedom of navigation and of fishing on the high seas on the basis that the 
United States was itself exercising sovereignty over its OCS under OCSLA. Its 
audience was the international community, not the states. This conclusion, it will 
appear presently, is less critical for the narrowly ambited OCSLA ’53 than for 
regionally focused OCSLA ’78.   
 
B.  DOI Discretion in Managing the OCS Leasing Program 
 
 With the hindsight afforded by OCSLA’s 1978 amendments, the most 
shocking aspect to current observers of Congress’s 1953 delegation to DOI of 
authority to manage the OCS leasing program is its failure to attend to the program’s 
environmental consequences. The breadth of DOI’s discretionary authority recalls a 
Cold War era obsessed with national security threats and comfortable in its faith 
that the Administrative State will act with wisdom and unrestrained vigor in pursuit 
of the public interest.    
 
The former plays out in Congressional discussion and resulting OCSLA 
provisions relating to staunch protection of the freedom of the seas for the nation’s 
navy;87 exclusion of states from “intermingling of national and international rights” 
associated with OCS management;88 reservation of the right to terminate leases89 
and to exercise a right of first refusal to OCS mineral wealth in time of war or 
necessity 90; to withdraw strategically significant OCS areas from leasing,91 and to 
reserve OCS helium92 and  “all other materials determined  pursuant  to … the 
Atomic Energy Act … to be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable 
material…”93 
 
 The Secretary’s freedom to ignore environmental values is mirrored in 
OCSLA ‘53’s absence of the citizen suit, environmental impact statement, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(emphasis added). Hence, the division in text among “sovereignty,” “jurisdiction and 
control,” and “regulation.” 
86 See 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).  
87 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.  
88 See 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).  
89 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(c) (2006). 
90 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(b) (2006). 
91 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(d) (2006). 
92 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(f) (2006). 
93 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(e) (2006). 
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information disclosure, polluter-based civil liability, and state and local government 
consultation provisions that were to become staples of the post-1969 
environmental era.  These voids appear with special clarity in OCSLA 53’s grant to 
the Secretary to conduct the OCS leasing program:  
 
The Secretary shall administer the provisions of this Act relating to the 
leasing of the outer Continental Shelf, and shall prescribe such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. The Secretary 
may at any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he 
determines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for the prevention 
of waste and conservation of natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf 
and the protection of correlative rights therein.94 
 
Like Sir Conan Doyle’s dog that didn’t bark, the provision’s significance for the later 
environmental age lies in what it does not say. DOI made no effort to claim or 
implement the environmental rationale ultimately provided by OCSLA ’78 that 
would justify extending OCSLA’s maritime pollution regulation well beyond drilling 
platforms themselves.  
 
C. Law Selection and Application under OCSLA Sections 1333(a)(1) and  
(a)(2)(A) 
 
 Selecting the body of law to govern OCS drilling activities presented OCSLA’s 
draftsmen with two problems of uncertain dimensions. Which OCS activities and 
events should be targeted? Which body of law should govern these activities? 
 
 Senator Condon was clear that governance of the civil and criminal activities 
of thousands of expected platform workers was a must.95 But neither he nor his 
colleagues provided content for the prospective law’s coverage beyond his reference 
to a “housekeeping law for the outer shelf,”96 which should address “industrial 
accidents, accidental deaths, [and]‘peace and order.’”97 Congress’s appreciation that 
unanticipated concerns would emerge over time perhaps explains why, beyond 
activities atop drilling platforms, it chose a matrix consisting of one precise but 
easily identifiable variable and a second imprecise variable, the content of which 
would be filled in over time. Hence, OCSLA ‘53’s section 1333(a)(1)’s and (a)(2)(A)’s 
                                                        
94 S.B. 1901, sec. 5(a)(1), as reproduced in H.Rep. No. 83-413, at 3 (1953). 
95 In presenting S.B. 1901, Senator Condon stressed the need for “so-called social 
laws “ that would be needed to address the full range of civil and criminal law 
requirements created by the anticipated thousands of OCS platform workers.” 99 
Cong. Rec. 6962 (1953).  For a contemporaneous account of these expectations, see 
generally Warren Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Key to a New 
Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (1953).  
96 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).  
97 Id. 
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fix on location, tightly defined to include only the OCS subsoil and seabed, artificial 
islands, and fixed structures, and section 1333(a)(1)’s lock on activity, amply 
conceived to encompass “exploring for, developing, or producing [OCS] resources … 
or transporting such resources.” 
 
1. Sections 1333(a)(1) and 1333(a)(2)(A): Of Substantive Law, Law Selection 
and Law Application 
 
 The draftsmen then turned to selecting the body of law that would best 
accommodate these criteria. OCSLA ‘53’s legislative history reflects that this so-
called choice of law process –which, more accurately, is a constitutionally and 
(federal) statutorily dictated law selection and application process -- features three 
different candidates and a two-stage process.  At the outset of the hearings, the 
candidates were Congress’s federal non-admiralty law, (federal) admiralty/general 
maritime law, and state law functioning ex proprio vigore.   
 
Having presided over the Senate’s definitive rejection of admiralty law and 
superintended a bill largely identical to the eventual OCSLA ’53 version, Senator 
Condon confirmed this format in his statement that 
 
to carry out the primary purposes of the measure, a body of law is extended 
to the outer Shelf area, consisting of a) the Constitution and the laws and the 
civil and political jurisdiction of the Federal Government; b) the regulations, 
rules and operating orders of the Secretary of the Interior; and c) in the 
absence of such applicable Federal law or adequate Secretarial regulation, 
the civil and criminal laws of the State adjacent to the outer shelf area.”98 
 
The two-stage process requires, first, determining whether applicable federal 
non-admiralty law exists and, if so, selecting and applying it; and, second, only after 
a determination that there is no applicable non-admiralty federal law,99 employing 
as surrogate federal law an OCSLA-endorsed state law that is not itself 
“inconsistent…with other Federal laws.” OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) addresses the 
first stage; section 1333(a)(2)(A), the second.100 
                                                        
98 Sen. Rep. No. 83-411 at 2 (1953).  
99 See, e.g., Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d 577, 585 (5th Cir. 1073) (the term “applicable 
[in section 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) must] be read in terms of necessity –necessity to 
fill a significant void or gap.”); Continental Oil Co; v. London S.S. Owner’s Mut. Ins. 
Ass’n, Ltd., 417 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970) 
(same). 
100 The discussion in text addresses the selection of law applicable to a controversy 
in which OCSLA subject matter jurisdiction has already been established under 
OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1349(b)(1) (2006), a requirement that Macondo litigation 
obviously satisfies as a case or controversy “arising out of, or in connection with …  
any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, 
development, or production of the minerals … of the outer Continental Shelf.” See In 
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So focused has been the attention of most courts and commentators on the 
latter section that they have generally overlooked that section 1333(a)(1) also 
licenses a law identification and application process that, when applicable federal 
law to be applied is present, takes priority over section 1333(a)(2)(A). Macondo 
affords the obvious example: the OCSLA/OPA combination provides the applicable 
federal law under section 1333(a)(1), and this law will provide the dominant and, 
possibly, exclusive basis for affixing liability for economic loss. 
 
Nor is there any reason to conclude that the section would be any less 
capable than section 1333(a)(2)(A) of generating other substantive effects.101 Let us 
anticipate for purposes of current argument that the OCSLA ‘78 amendment 
bringing “temporarily attached “ drilling platforms under section 1333(a)(1) is in 
effect, and ask why a tort involving these platforms is any less subject to governance 
under this section as applicable law than a tort occurring on a “fixed structure” 
under section 1333(a)(2)(A).   
 
Denying that section 1333(a)(1) is endowed with law-selecting and -applying 
authority while affirming this authority in section 1333(a)(2)(A) is indefensible. 
Rodrigue itself opens with the proposition that “[s]ection [1333(a)(1)]extends the 
‘Constitution and laws … of the United States’” to OCSLA situses, then immediately 
complements this declaration with the assertion that “[a]ll law applicable to the 
outer Continental Shelf is federal law….”102 Both of these sections, moreover, appear 
under the heading “Laws and regulations governing land”, not the current 
sovereignty” section 1332, entitled “Congressional declaration of policy.”103 Nor is 
there any perceivable linguistic basis for assigning different law-
                                                                                                                                                                     
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” MDL No. 2179, 2010 WL 3943451 
(E.D. La. 2010) (Barbier, J.). 
101 EP Operating Ltd. Ptns’p v. Placid Oil Co. 26 F.3rd 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1994) states 
that “[the] body of substantive law identified in Section 1333 was intended ‘to 
govern the full range of potential legal problems that might arise in connection with 
operations on the Outer Continental Shelf. [citing Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc.  
v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d. 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1085)] Thus, the OCSLA casts a broad 
substantive net in section 1333.” The court continued that “we find that the most 
consistent reading of the statute instructs that the jurisdictional grant of section 1349 
should be read co-extensively with the substantive reach of section 1333.” EP 
Operating Ltd. Ptns’p at 569 (emphasis added).  
102 Rodrigue at 356. 
103 An additional goal of section 1333(2) as amended by OCSLA ’78 may have been 
to bring OCS drilling fixtures of all kinds under OCSLA’s coverage, as Professor 
Robertson suggests. See note supra note 72. But the considerations addressed in 
text when combined with the role OCSLA ’78 assigns section 1333(a)(1) (2006) in 
conjunction with title III’s civil liability regime, among other 1978 amendments, 
reflect that Congress’s primary motivation lay elsewhere than this secondary and, 
given the wording of OCSLA sec. 1332(1) (2006), largely redundant task.  
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selection/application outcomes to the two sections. OCSLA’s drafters104, the 
Supreme Court 105and OCSLA itself106 repeatedly use the terms  “apply” or 
“applicable” (section 1333(a)(2)(A)) interchangeably with the term “extend” 
(section 1333(a)(1)). Pertinent as well is Senator Condon’s bundling together 
without distinction or qualification both sections’ sources of law –federal law 
(section 1333(a)(1)), on the one side, and Secretarial regulations and state law 
(section 1333(a)(2)(A)) on the other.  
 
2.  Admiralty Law, Federal Non-Admiralty Law or State Law? 
 
Although amendments or earlier versions of House and Senate legislation 
provided that OCS operations be governed either by admiralty law or by state law as 
such, federal non-admiralty law was the hands-down winner in a legislative debate 
in which admiralty law never made it to the finishing line. The original Senate bill 
cleared the way for admiralty law’s preemptive governance of OCS activities in its 
declaration that “[a]ll acts occurring on any structure (other than a vessel) located 
on OCS or waters above shall be adjudicated according to the laws relating to such 
acts or offenses occurring on vessels of the United States on the high seas.” 107 But 
the Senate unequivocally withdrew its support for admiralty law in the course of 
vigorous, subsequent debate. 
 
Opposition centered on three principal objections, each of which reflect 
admiralty law’s remoteness from OCS operations. The first and perhaps most 
influential was admiralty law’s inability to furnish what Senator Condon termed 
“‘so-called social laws’“ for the protection of affected workers and their families.”108 
The second was that admiralty’s choice of the “law of the shipowner’s place” might 
                                                        
104 Illustrative of passages found throughout the reports and debates of both houses 
is the Senate Report’s statement that the “jurisdiction of the Federal Government is 
extended to [OCSLA situses]….[and] the Constitution and laws of the United States 
are made applicable….” Insular Hearings supra note 83, at 17-18.   
105 The Supreme Court’s assessment of 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006) in Rodrigue 
similarly treats the latter’s term “extend” as interchangeable with “applicable” or 
“apply” in the Court’s observation that the section “makes ‘the Constitution and laws 
of the United States’ apply to the same extent as if the outer Constitutional Shelf 
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a state.” Rodrigue at 
357. (emphasis added).  
106 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec.1333(f) (2006) reinforces the “applicability” of federal law in 
43 sec. 1333(a)(1) by declaring that specification “of certain provisions of law [in 43 
U.S.C. sec.1333(a)]… shall not give rise to any inference that the application … of any 
other provisions of law is not intended.” (emphasis added). “Any other provisions of 
law,” of course, includes the “laws … of the United States” referenced in 43 U.S.C. sec. 
1333(a)(1) (2006). 
107Insular Hearings, supra note 83, at 2. 
108 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).    
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lead to the application of different laws to the same incident in the event of multiple 
owners or operators of OCS facilities.109  
 
A third objection was that “[m]aritime law in the strict sense has never had 
to deal with the resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill 
adapted for that purpose.”110 This objection departs from the narrow spatial 
confines or purposes associated with the employer/worker and worker/worker 
interactions atop drilling platforms. The subject of comment in Rodrigue as well, its 
scope remained largely undefined until the completion of OCSLA’s second and third 
phases.   
  
State law111 also failed to gain unqualified support despite its forceful 
advantage over admiralty law that it addresses head-on the welfare concerns of 
adjacent state platform workers. The principal objections focused on the status of 
the OCS as “uniquely an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction and control,”112 and 
the impropriety for the conduct of the nation’s foreign policy of “intermingling of 
national and international rights in the area.”113 Muted in the hearings but clearly 
influential114 was also Congress’s desire to reserve OCS oil drilling public revenues 
to the federal government, having just surrendered to the states title to and revenue 
associated with submerged lands drilling under their territorial seas.115 
 
But Congress nevertheless established state law’s superiority over admiralty 
law in a compromise the Supreme Court described as having been achieved by 
“dropping the treatment of [fixed drilling structures] as ‘vessels’ ….”116 The 
compromise was neither about nor designed to accommodate admiralty law, which 
Congress unceremoniously excised by denying the fixed structures status as “vessels.” 
The accommodation was between state and non-admiralty federal law, and the 
compromise took form as canonizing the former as surrogate federal law, not as 
providing for admiralty law’s reentry through a back door as majority Fifth Circuit 
jurisprudence subsequently decreed. 117  
                                                        
109 See generally Insular Hearings, supra. n. 83 at 411-35. 
110 Insular Hearings, supra note 83, at 668 (statement of Richard Young, Esq.. 
Member of the New York State Bar).  
111 H.B. 5134, sec. 9(a) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to adopt the laws of 
the adjacent state ex proprio vigore if the state so provides, and to reimburse the 
state for its administrative costs. See H.R. Rep No. 83-413, at 8-9 (1953).   
112 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).  
113 Id. 
114OCSLA , 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) provides that  “State taxation laws 
shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.” 
115 See Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified 
at 43 U.S.C. secs. 1311(a) (2006)). OCSLA ’53 took form as an amendment to this Act.  
116 Rodrigue at 365. 
117 See supra note 60. 
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D. Rodrigue, the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit  
 
State law exerts less influence in the Macondo scenario than in the Fifth 
Circuit model because Macondo pits federal law –OCSLA and OPA—against general 
maritime law, not general maritime law against state law. But it is considered at 
length here for several reasons. One is that the evident disparity between the Fifth 
Circuit’s treatment of the issue and OCSLA’s legislative history is hostile to the claim 
that OCS drilling operations satisfy Executive Jet’s substantial relationship test. 
Macondo may present, in addition, a “mini-gap” problem, which arises when the 
section 1333(a)(1) applicable federal law filling the “maxi-gap” is itself pockmarked 
with a void or two that requires the use of section 1333(a)(2)(A) to fill the resulting 
“mini-gap.”  Possibly illustrative is the silence of OPA, as one of the applicable 
section 1333(a)(1) federal laws, on punitive damages, which some observers 
believe is a void, rather than a conscious omission, that needs to be filled in this 
manner. Finally, the discussion provides a convenient portal into Rodrigue itself.  
 
Like all truly seminal cases, Rodrigue works on multiple levels, some of them 
apparent only years after decision day. Its significance in the Fifth Circuit has waxed 
or waned in consequence of such changes external to itself as the successive 
amendment of OCSLA over a half-century and the four-decade evolution of the 
Executive Jet principle, including its gradual convergence, if not fusion with Rodrigue 
itself.118 Rodrigue’s levels align with minimalist, mid-level and Executive Jet-level 
readings. At the last-named level, Rodrigue is experiencing a second life in which, 
ironically, it is proving even more toxic to inappropriate admiralty claims than had 
it not been neutralized by the Fifth Circuit in its first life.  
 
1. The Minimalist Level 
 
 The Circuit’s minimalist position essentially involves four steps. The first is 
that OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s and (a)(2)(A)’s references to federal law are 
generic; they do not expressly exclude or otherwise restrict admiralty law despite 
Congress’s hostility to the latter as the appropriate vehicle for OCS governance. 
Second, section 1333(a)(2)(A) disqualifies an OCSLA-endorsed state law candidate 
if it is “inconsistent” with “other Federal law” which, under the first step, includes 
admiralty law. Third, the locations referenced as OCSLA situses by the statute are 
not traditional admiralty situses in any event; therefore, events or locations that 
qualified for admiralty jurisdiction pre-OCLSA continue to do so post-OCSLA on the 
basis that admiralty law “applies of its own force.” Fourth, if admiralty law is found 
to apply of its own force, inconsistent state law must yield both because admiralty 
jurisdiction ousts OCSLA jurisdiction if the two overlap, and because admiralty law 
                                                        
118 See infra Part IV.B.2.  
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prevails under OCSLA as the “other Federal law” with which the state law is 
inconsistent.119 
  
2.  The Mid-Level 
 
Rodrigue’s second level takes the Supreme Court’s straightforward 
evaluation of Congress’s negative perception of admiralty law at face value, and 
employs it to balance out the Fifth Circuit’s selective interpretation of Rodrigue, 
which is not inaccurate within its tight self-chosen parameters.  It is true, as the 
Circuit reasons, that the Supreme Court agreed that OCSLA situses, as defined by 
Congress, would not have activated admiralty jurisdiction under traditional 
principles.120  
 
But Congress’s  designation of these situses as if they were non-admiralty 
destinations in actual fact  was as fanciful an exercise as Congress’s earlier 
designation of the Guano Islands as a United States “vessel” in order to administer 
these actual islands under United States admiralty law.121 Indeed, the Senate’s initial 
OCSLA draft would have constituted the OCSLA situses admiralty sites,122 which 
they are for purposes of the Admiralty Extension Act.123 But for Congress’s 
solicitude for the welfare of adjacent state platform workers, the Senate’s 
designation of sites as “vessels” would not have been expunged, and fixed drilling 
platforms would be admiralty situses.124 Ascribing ontological status to an utterly 
discretionary label –equating a statutorily designated “artificial island” with an 
actual island, for example-- is a useful admiralty jurisdiction-protective device in the 
same way in which claiming a watercraft is a really a “vessel” independent of its 
classification in the statute pertinent to the inquiry serves the same purpose. Just 
ask Lewis Carroll.125 
 
The Supreme Court would appear to have done so, as evidenced by its 
statement that   
 
                                                        
119 For a step-by-step summary of the Fifth Circuit’s logic as seen from the bench, 
see Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp., 836 F. Supp. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1993). 
120 See Rodrigue at 355. 
121 See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890). 
122 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
123 46 U.S.C. sec. 30101 (2006). See Continental Oil Co. v. London S.S. Owners’ Mut. 
Ins. Ass’n, 417 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1969) (Admiralty Extension Act applies to 
collision of vessel with an OCS fixed drilling platform). 
124 See Rodrigue at 365. 
125 The reference, of course, is to Humpty Dumpty who, like Congress, can have its 
language mean “just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” Lewis 
Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There 213 (Martin 
Gardner ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2000)(1897). 
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[e]ven if admiralty law would have applied to the deaths occurring under 
traditional principles, the legislative history shows that Congress did not 
intend that result. First, Congress assumed that admiralty law would not 
apply [to the OCS situs] unless Congress made it apply, and then Congress 
decided not to make it apply.126 
 
The statement effectively paraphrases Humpty Dumpty’s response to a perplexed 
Alice: “The question is …. which is to be master –that’s all.” In placing Congress in 
the role of  “master,” the Court acknowledges that Congress intends OCSLA, not 
admiralty law, to serve as the OCS’s parent law, and that unless Congress chooses 
otherwise  --presumably by a statute to the contrary-- such OCSLA shall be. 
 
 Why would the Court impose the burden on Congress to negate the use of the 
OCSLA alternative in a particular case rather than placing the burden to show that 
admiralty law does not apply on the party invoking OCSLA, as the Fifth Circuit does? 
The answer is spread throughout Rodrigue’s pages. OCSLA’s oil and admiralty’s water 
simply don’t mix. Addressing the inapplicability of admiralty law not only to fixed 
platforms, but to the OCS seabed and subsoil, the Court counseled that the Senate 
Committee “was acutely aware of the inaptness of admiralty law. The bill applied 
the same law to the seabed and subsoil as well as to the artificial islands, and 
admiralty law was obviously unsuited to that task.127  
 
Even more telling is the Court’s assessment of an admiralty expert’s testimony 
that “[m]aritime law in the strict sense has never had to deal with the resources in 
the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill adapted for that purpose”128: 
 
Since the Act treats seabed, subsoil, and artificial islands the same, dropping any 
reference to special treatment for presumptive vessels, the most sensible 
interpretation of Congress' reaction to this testimony is that admiralty treatment 
was eschewed altogether….129  
 
3. The Executive Jet Level 
 
A third way of reading Rodrigue is to isolate passages that stun in departing 
from the OCSLA situs issue altogether to ask whether, in light of the purpose of the 
activity giving rise to the plaintiffs’ deaths, admiralty jurisdiction applies at all. The 
                                                        
126 Rodrigue at 361 (emphasis added). For other examples of Congress’s assignment 
of shifting and even conflicting connotations to the same definitional term that place 
it within or outside of the “vessel” category, see the discussion of OCSLA’s and OPA’s 
definitions of the terms “temporarily attached” installation, “MODU,” “offshore 
facility,” and “Outer Continental Shelf facility” infra Part IV. A.  
127 Id. at 364-65. 
128 Insular Hearings, at 669 (Statement of Richard Young, Esq., Member of the New 
York State Bar).  
129 Rodrigue at 365 n.12. 
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pertinent passages are those relating to the Court’s discussion of its 1908 action 
sustaining, without opinion130, a federal district court decision, Phoenix Construction 
Company v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 131 holding that the collision of a vessel with a 
platform erected around piles placed in the Hudson River to support construction of 
an aqueduct did not engage admiralty jurisdiction.132 The Court expressly approved 
the lower court’s ruling denying admiralty jurisdiction because the project’s 
purpose –supplying water transported by the aqueduct to a metropolitan area-- 
was, in terms used by the lower court133 and approved in Rodrigue,134 “not even 
suggestive of maritime affairs.” 
 
The Court offered further insight into its view of purpose seventeen years later 
in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray,135 which reversed a Fifth Circuit holding that an 
injured welder who worked on pipelines and drilling platforms was engaged in 
“maritime employment” under LHWCA sec. 902(3). Declaring that the Circuit’s 
position that “offshore drilling is maritime commerce” is “untenable”, it singled out 
Rodrigue’s use of Phoenix to reassert that drilling platforms are “not even suggestive 
of maritime affairs.”136 The Court then linked its purpose inquiry back to OCSLA by 
adverting to Rodrigue’s assessment of OCSLA’s legislative history to conclude that 
the latter “at the very least forecloses the Court of Appeals holding that offshore 
drilling is a marine activity….”137 The plaintiff, the Court stated 
 
built and maintained pipelines and the platforms themselves. There is nothing 
inherently maritime about those tasks. They are also performed on land, and 
their nature is not significantly altered by the marine environment, particularly 
since exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are not themselves 
maritime commerce.”138  
 
The purpose analysis is joined at the hip with, if not identical to Executive Jet’s 
substantial relationship test,139 which helps explain why Executive Jet singles out 
                                                        
130 Phoenix Construction Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 212 U.S. 558 (1908). 
131 Phoenix Construction Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 162 F. 494 (1908). 
132 Rodrigue at 360.  
133 Phoenix Construction Co., 162 F. at 496. 
134 Rodrigue at 360. 
135470 U.S. 414 (1986). 
136 Id. at 424-25. 
137Id. (emphasis added).  
138 Id. at 425 (emphasis added). 
139 Illustrative of the essential interchangeability of the two cases in the OCS drilling 
context is the Fifth Circuit’s use of Rodrigue to deny admiralty jurisdiction on 
grounds functionally indistinguishable from Executive Jet’s substantial relationship 
test. See, e.g., Hufnagel v. Omega Service Indus. Inc., 182 F.3rd 340, 353 (5th Cir. 
1999); Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g. Corp, 895 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, Union Texas Petroleum v. State Service Co., 498 U.S. 848 (1990). 
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Rodrigue as an exemplar of the position it espouses.140 Both ask essentially the same 
question: is there a sufficient fit between admiralty and the pertinent activity –the 
provision of water to a municipality in Phoenix, or the airplane flight between two 
fixed land locations in Executive Jet—to warrant subjecting the latter to admiralty’s 
jurisdiction, rules and procedures? 
E. Of Maxi-Gaps, Mini-Gaps, Section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s “other Federal laws,” and 
Admiralty Law’s “Application of its own Force” 
 OCSLA Section 1333(a)(2)(A) will not play the same role in the Macondo 
setting that it does under the Fifth Circuit model, if indeed it plays any role at all.   
The former model, as earlier noted, opposes OCSLA and OPA with their admiralty-
displacing capabilities against general maritime law, while the latter pits federal 
general maritime law against state law. The Fifth Circuit model’s concern is with 
“maxi-gaps,” that is, a complete absence of federal law under section 1333(a)(1), 
which must be filled through the section 1333(a)(2)(A) vehicle. Macondo avoids 
maxi-gaps because OCSLA and OPA provide comprehensive and detailed federal law 
pursuant both to the section 1333(a)(1) and as independent statements of 
applicable federal law.141  
But section 1333(a)(2)(A) may not fall out of the picture altogether. It will if 
a court were to conclude that in an action for economic loss, OPA, as successor to 
OCSLA’s title III, totally supplants general maritime law because it speaks 
seamlessly (without gaps) to Macondo’s economic loss issues. But if a void or two is 
found in the interstices of OPA’s otherwise comprehensive coverage, section 
1333(a)(2)(A) will likely be needed to fill these “mini-gaps.” 142   
 How will Macondo’s pre-OCSLA status as a maritime tort play out? The 
minimalist Fifth Circuit approach brings admiralty law in through section 
1333(a)(2)(A)’s back door, assuming any of the following do not occur.  Executive 
Jet/Rodrigue reasoning rules admiralty jurisdiction out altogether. Macondo loses its 
status as an admiralty event under OCSLA/OPA because the Gusher and the 
Talisman issue are resolved against admiralty. Macondo reaches the Supreme Court, 
which chooses to resolve its tug of war with the Fifth Circuit by confirming the 
previously quoted view it expressed in Huson that OCSLA “ousts admiralty law and 
specifically directs that state law shall be adopted as federal law.”  
                                                        
140 Executive Jet at 258-59. 
141 OPA’s legislative history reflects Congress’s intent through OPA to enact a single, 
comprehensive federal act providing clean-up authority, penalties and liability for 
oil pollution S. Rep 101-94, at 8-9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 802.  
See, e.g., Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.). Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 750 (E.D. La. 2009); 
Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 Fed. Supp. 1436, 
1447 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 122 F. 3rd 1062 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 1021 
(1998). 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100 and accompanying text.   
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 A simpler resolution would have the Fifth Circuit follow the direction limned 
in Rodrigue and proposed in its own Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil 
Company143: refuse to strike the OCSLA-endorsed state law absent a statute 
preferring admiralty law. A federal statute will likely be required in section 
1333(a)(2)(A) contests when the OCSLA-endorsed measure’s claimed inconsistency 
is with a non-admiralty federal matter. Why shouldn’t admiralty be held to a 
requirement of at least parity with non-admiralty federal spheres?  In OCSLA ’53’s 
legislative history, moreover, Congress expressly denied that admiralty law should 
serve as OCS’s default law. Yet the Fifth Circuit’s minimalist position re-establishes 
general maritime law in precisely this role. It is anomalous, finally, to restore 
admiralty law in the Macondo setting where the norms precluding the maxi-gap are 
themselves non-admiralty and in OCSLA’s instance, anti-admiralty federal statutes.  
F. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase I 
Rodney Dangerfield Issue: Lack of respect for sec. 1333(a)(1) is premature (as 
well as inconsistent with OCSLA’s legislative history) because the question is not 
seriously tested in Phase I. Judicial focus on OCSLA sec. 1333(a)(2)(a) was 
appropriate during this phase because the Fifth Circuit model largely accommodates  
the era’s litigation paradigm. 
Talisman Issue: “Fixed structures” are targeted both in sec. 1333(a)(1) and 
(a)(2)(A) during phase I, rendering classification of non-fixed, i.e., mobile or floating 
structures, as “vessels” non-controversial. That this interpretation might be 
erroneous, however, appears retroactively in OCSLA ’78’s legislative history, in 
which the Congressional conferees explained that the 1978 substitution in OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(1) of “temporarily attached” devices for “fixed structures” is 
intended to be “technical and perfecting and is meant to restate and clarify and not 
to change existing law.” 144  
Gusher Issue: Section 1332’s protection of freedom of navigation is not an 
abnegation of Congress’s power to regulate the high seas for police and sanitary 
purposes. But the latter function was vaguely in play, if at all, in OCSLA ’53 litigation, 
which centered on activity atop platforms and the welfare of platform workers and 
their families, not pollution and public lands control activities throughout the 
platform’s region.  
Alien Issue: The substantial relationship rationale was afforded great respect, 
and quickly found itself on a post-1972 course favoring integration as a component 
of the Fifth Circuit’s OCSLA sec. 1333(a)(2)(A) inquiry.145  
                                                        
143 754 F.2d 1223, 1230-1232 (5th Cir. 1985) 
144 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1474, at 6 (1978)(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1674, 16479 (emphasis added). 
145 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 139; infra Part IV.B.2.  
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III. OCSLA Phase II: OCSLA ’78 –‘90 
The quarter century following OCSLA’s enactment saw a nation-wide 
embrace of environmental consciousness, the proliferation of environmental 
statutes, a loss of public confidence in agency expertise and independence from the 
regulated sector, the drilling of OCS wells ever deeper and further out through 
revolutionary advances in technology and drilling platform design and construction, 
and, ominously, scores of catastrophic oil spills. The 1969 Santa Barbara OCS well 
blowout, in fact, ushered in the post-60’s environmental era. By the mid-70’s, 
successful NEPA suits and drilling moratoria covering much of the nation’s east and 
west coasts severely hampered OCS oil production,146 which the federal 
government, then as now, viewed as essential for national defense and economy and 
for federal revenue.147 The stage was set for redrafting OCSLA to rein in DOI 
discretion, and to remedy the 1953 Act’s inattention to the federal government’s 
trusteeship obligations over its public lands and to OCS petroleum discharges.  
 
A. Overview of the “New Statutory  Regime”  
 
The summary of the senate bill addressed in the Senate Ad Hoc Committee’s 
report premised OCSLA ‘78’s transformation on Congress’s plenary  power under 
the property clause set forth in Kleppe v. New Mexico.148 Congress, the summary 
declares   
  
has a special constitutional responsibility to make all needful rules and 
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the 
United States under article IV, section 3, clause 2. The existing Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act is essentially a carte blanche delegation of 
authority to the Secretary of the Interior. The increased consideration of the 
importance of OCS resources, the increased consideration of the 
environmental and onshore impacts, and emphasis on comprehensive 
planning require that Congress detail standards for the Secretary (of DOI) to 
follow in the exercise of his authority.”149 
                                                        
146 This litigation as well as the policy issues dividing environmentalists from the 
federal government and the oil industry are detailed in Robert Wiygul, The 
Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer Continental Shelf, 12 J. Energy, 
Nat. Res. & Environmental Law 785 (1992).  
147 See President’s Commission Report at 59-67 
148 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (the “power over public land thus entrusted to Congress is 
without limitations”)(quoting United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 
U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).  
149 H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461. 
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Senators understood in 1978 that they were not simply tinkering with their 
earlier work. On the contrary, they described OCSLA ’53 as “outmoded,”150 and 
undertook “to provide a new statutory regime for the management of the oil and 
natural gas resources of the OCS.”151  
 
The “new statutory regime” addressed five perceived defects of OCSLA ’53. At 
the top of the list was Congress’s intention to introduce balance between what 
Senator Henry Jackson, Senate Committee chair, described as “oil and gas 
development and [the] potentially adverse economic, social and environmental 
impacts that accompany it.”152  The revised statute “goes a long way toward 
alleviating the public’s fears that were spawned by the disastrous Santa Barbara 
Channel blowout nine years ago and by other environmentally destructive oil spills 
from tankers that followed.”153  
  
The environmental side of the balance offers a second element: management 
of the OCS blowout and spill pollution threat through a variety of amended 
provisions154 alongside a totally new title III, which largely anticipates OPA’s  
                                                        
150 Id. at 9. 
151 Id. at 8.  
152 124 Cong. Rec. 27262 (1978).  
153 Id. Senator Dewey F. Bartlett added that  “the “most serious cause of delays in the 
Outer Continental program to date have been a series of vexatious environmental 
law suits which have delayed a number of Outer Continental Shelf lease sales.” Id. at 
27263. Of special relevance to this paper is Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. 
Andrus, 94 F.2d 872 (lst Cir. 1979), which, on the basis of Congress’s adoption of 
OCSLA ’78, lifted a preliminary injunction imposed by the lower court under NEPA 
on the leasing of submerged lands in the fisheries-rich Georges Bank region. The 
Circuit Court reasoned that OCSLA ‘78’s battery of environmental safeguards would 
duplicate the environmental scrutiny demanded by NEPA. 
154 For a detailed account of these provisions, see Robert Wiygul, supra note 152 at 
Parts II-IV. Of special relevance for this paper are the inclusion in 0CSLA 43 U.S.C. 
sec. 1331 (2006) of subsections (f)-(i) defining, respectively, the terms “affected 
state,” “marine,” “coastal” and “human  environment[s];” and subsections (k)-(m) 
expanding the definitions, respectively of “exploration,” “development,” and 
“production.” These provisions explicitly merge consideration of OCS oil operations 
on distant OCS locations with their environmental and pollution control 
consequences on state territorial seas and state inland areas. They thereby add the 
other half of the environmental equation omitted by OCSLA ‘53’s focus on the OCS 
operations alone. OCSLA 43 USC sec. 1333(6) (2006) singles out the need to address 
“blowouts, loss of well control, fire, spillages … or other occurrences which may 
cause damage to the environment or to property or danger life or health.” Meriting 
special attention is OCSLA ‘78’s substitution of the phrase  “and all installations and 
other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed” for the former 
“fixed structures” in 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006) and ancillary section 
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Subchapter I liability and compensation elements. OCSLA’s “new statutory regime’s” 
contrasts with the Fifth Circuit model are stark. The Circuit’s jurisprudence, as 
noted, is premised on a discrete tort-atop-the-platform model. OCSLA ’78’s range, 
instead is as expansive as its environmental/pollution control/ecological goals 
require.155 The Fifth Circuit model reflects the imprint of OCSLA ‘53’s concern for 
the welfare needs of adjoining state platform workers.  The 1978 model leaves these 
values in place, but enlarges OCSLA’s scope by encompassing regional ecological 
values. The Fifth Circuit model follows OCSLA ‘53’s targeting of a “horizontal” slice 
only of the OCS seabed. But an international consensus emerged over the 
intervening quarter century favoring national regimes premised on OCSLA ‘78’s 
three-dimensional model.156 In consequence, Senator Muskie and his colleagues did 
not hesitate to include the OCS airshed as well as OCS submerged lands and the 
waters above OCS and state submerged lands in the model.157 
 
These shifts also highlight sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006)’s role both as a law 
selection vehicle and OCSLA, including the section itself, as an expanded source of 
substantive law for managing blowouts and spills. By confirming OCSLA’s status as a 
non-admiralty public lands and pollution control statute, moreover, they render the 
Macondo scenario even more remote from the link necessary to satisfy Executive 
Jet’s substantial relation test. 
 
A third element is OCSLA ‘78’s addition of an array of environmental 
concerns beyond controlling the risks and consequences of OCS blowouts and spills 
alone.158 Assaults on DOI leasing decisions under these provisions, usually in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
subdivisions. This substitution draws semisubmersibles such as the Deepwater 
Horizon directly under OCSLA’s coverage, a result that, given OCSLA’s anti-admiralty 
cast, detracts from the claim that OCS operations conducted in conjunction with 
semisubmersibles satisfy Executive Jet’s “substantial relationship” test. Since this 
amendment also serves as the flywheel driving the title III liability section, among 
other functions, it deflates the claim that 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) lacks substantive 
effect. See supra Part II.C.1.  
155 OCSLA’s coverage of the horizontal seabed and high seas portion of the three 
dimensional model derives principally from 43 U.S.C. secs. 1331(a), (e)-(i), 
1333(a)(1), and Title III. The vertical air shed cap is specified by 43 U.S.C. sec. 
1344(a)(8) (2006), which obligates DOI to comply with the Clean Air Act “to the 
extent that activities authorized [by OCSLA] affect the air quality of any State.”   
156 Art. 24, Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 
5200 provides that “every state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the 
seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or results from the exploration 
and exploitation of the sea and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaties on the 
subject.” 
157 See 43 U.S.C. sec. 1344(a)(8) (2006).  
158 In addition to the provisions cited in n. 160, an illustrative selection of these 
controls or associated provisions includes the gamut of title III provisions addressed 
in text, see infra Part III.B.; citizen suits,43 U.S.C. sec. 1349(1) (2006); DOI authority 
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conjunction with one or more of such supporting measures as NEPA,159 the Coastal 
Zone Management Act,160 the Endangered Species Act161, or the Administrative 
Procedure Act,162 witness the breadth of these concerns.163 
  
A fourth element is Congress’s insistence on curbing DOI’s discretion to 
override environmental and pollution control values in its leasing decisions. In the 
’78 hearing process, OCSLA ‘53 was criticized as an “‘all too general’ piece of 
legislation containing few mandates for the Secretary of the Interior.”164 OCSLA ’78, 
on the other hand, directs that  
 
the whole outer Continental Shelf process, from preparation of a leasing 
program, selection of tracts for leasing, promulgation and enforcement of 
regulations, and review of activities must consider environmental 
consequences –to the water, to the air, to adjacent coastal areas, and to the 
living resources.”165 
 
A final element is Congress’s effort to identify and better coordinate the three 
successive phases of OCSLA’s  management of the oil cycle: authorization and 
regulation of public lands’ leasing, oversight of the leasing program’s environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to suspend or terminate oil and gas leases that threaten harm to coastal, marine and 
human environments, 43 U.S.C. sec. 1334(a)(1) and (2) (2006); control of the sale 
and management of these leases according to a tiered model encompassing 
incremental 5-year leasing programs within which individual leases may require 
approvals at the exploratory, development, and production stages, 43 U.S.C. secs. 
1334, 1340, 1344, and 1351 (2006); coordination of the tiered process with non-
OCSLA environmental measures including NEPA environmental assessments, 43 
U.S.C. sec. 1351 (2006); Clean Air Act national ambient air standard compliance, 43 
U.S.C. sec. 1344(a)(8) (2006); and DOI/coastal state consultations premised on state 
recommendations concerning leasing approvals, 43 U.S.C. secs. 1345(c) (2006).  
159 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 
(1970), at 42 U.S.C. secs. 4321-57 (2006).   
160 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280, at 16 
U.S.C. secs. 14561-65 (2006). 
161 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) at 16 
U.S.C. secs. 1531-43 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).  
162 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, secs. 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 
at 5 U.S.C. 551-559 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
163See, e.g., Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1988); Blanco v. 
Burton, 2006 WL 2366046 (E.D. La. 2008).  
164 H.R. Rep. 95-590, at 12 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1464.  
165 Id. at 7. Typical of the many sections that implement this directive, 43 U.S.C. sec. 
1344(a)(3) (2006) mandates that the “Secretary shall select the timing and location 
of leasing to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance 
between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of 
oil and gas and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”’  
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dimensions, and establishment of a legal regime defining both law selection and 
substantive legal principles, including among the latter those employed in Title III 
and elsewhere to address pollution prevention, civil liability and compensation 
issues.  The House committee report confirmed OCSLA ‘78’s establishment of well-
considered links among these formerly disparate or non-existent elements.  
 
No comprehensive national legislation presently exists for responsibility and 
liability for the effects of oil pollution resulting from activities on the Shelf. 
The purpose of [the bill], by requiring development of an OCS plan, 
establishing new management and regulatory requirements, mandating 
coordination with affected states, and providing compensation for damages 
to fishermen’s gear, for spills and for adverse impacts, is to cure these 
defects.166  
 
B. Section 1333(a)(1) and Title III 
 
1.  Of “Vessels” and “Offshore Facilities” 
 
The principal if not exclusive ground for admiralty jurisdiction asserted by 
parties to the Macondo MDL action is that the Deepwater Horizon exploratory 
drilling rig is a “vessel.“ This claim may prevail, assuming that it doesn’t founder on 
the rocks of Executive Jet’s substantial relationship test.  It entirely possible, 
however, that it will fail. In fact, its prospects for success would have been zero in 
the period between OCSLA’s amendment in 1978 and OPA’s adoption in 1990.  
 
 OPA repealed title III, however, and in OPA section 2701(37) attached the 
label “vessel” 167 to semisubmersible drilling rigs (which it also titled as “Mobile 
Offshore Drilling Units168 or MODUs). But it also acknowledged that MODUs are 
“capable of use as an “offshore facility,” a term that explicity excludes “vessels.”169  
OPA includes in this litany the term “Outer Continental Shelf facility,”170 which, if 
deemed to have been carried over from or substantially modeled upon OCSLA’s 
definition of “offshore facility,”171 undermines the equation of the Deepwater 
Horizon with a “vessel.” Where the Deepwater Horizon may end up in this sequence 
is addressed in the following subsection. 
 
Temporarily attached drilling rigs typically trigger admiralty jurisdiction 
under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A), which, as 
the sole predicate for law selection under the Fifth Circuit model, focuses on “fixed 
                                                        
166 H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 9 (1977).  
167 “[V]essel means every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance 
used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water….” 
168 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(18) (2006). 
169 33 U.S.C. 2701(22) (2006). 
170 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(25) (2006). 
171 Title III, sec. 301(8) (1978). 
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structures,” a category deemed to exclude floating rigs.172 But under the Macondo 
scenario, as explicitly addressed by the OCSLA ‘78’s pollution control regime, section 
1333(a)(1) is the governing provision for law selection and is itself a source of 
substantive law in conjunction with other amendments instituting its pollution 
control and liability regime. 
 
The House viewed OCSLA title III as providing the “procedures to be followed 
in the event of an oil spill and compensation for clean up costs and damages 
resulting from such a spill.”173 Title III covers “”spills from any offshore facility in the 
OCS” and “any oil tanker, barge or other watercraft which is operating in offshore 
areas, and which is carrying oil directly from an offshore facility.”174  The geographic 
coverage defined in OCSLA ’78 comports with the statute’s shift to a region-wide 
focus.175  
 
OCSLA’s “responsible parties” under title III are the owner/operator of either 
the “vessel” or the “offshore facility” which is the source of oil pollution.”176 
“Vessels” are limited to watercraft operating in OCS or territorial sea waters and 
which are “transporting oil directly from an offshore facility.”177  An “offshore 
facility,” on the other hand, is “any oil refinery, drilling structure, oil storage or 
transfer terminal, or pipeline, or any appurtenance related to any of the foregoing, 
which is used to drill for, produce, store, handle, transfer, process, or transport oil 
                                                        
172 See, e.g., Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F. 2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1966); Walsh 
v. Seagull Energy Corp, 836 F. Supp. 411, 414, 416 (S.D. Tex. 1993); In re Sedco, 543 
F. Supp. 561, 571-72 (D.C. Tex. 1982); cf. Stewart v. Dutra, 543 U.S. 481, 489-92 
(2005). But see EEX Corp. v . ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. 161 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751(S.D. Tex. 
2001)(“[A] vessel ceases to be a vessel the moment it attaches itself to the Shelf”). 
173 H.R. Rep. 95-1474, at 52, 1978 (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 
1725. 
174 Id. 
175 Title III, Sec. 304(a) (1978) declares that “[o]il pollution” comprehends the 
“unlawful“ discharge of oil in the waters above submerged lands seaward from the 
coastline of a State” or “on the adjacent shoreline of such a State”  or “on the waters 
of the contiguous zone,” or the “presence of oil in or on the waters of the high seas 
outside the territorial limits of the United States … when discharged in connection 
with activities conducted under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Shelf Lands Act.” 
This section adds the “slice” of waters above the OCS seabed to the “horizontal” 
regime of the 1953 OCSLA, which included only the OCS’s subsoil, seabed and 
natural resources. See supra Part II.A. The final slice is the airshed above these 
waters, which DOI is required to regulate for Clean Air Act purposes under OCSLA 
43 U.S.C. sec. 1334(a)(8) (2006). 
176 Title III, sec. 304(a) (1978).   
177 Title III, sec. 301(5) (1978) (emphasis added).  
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produced from the Outer Continental Shelf …, and is located on the Outer 
Continental Shelf, except that such term does not include … a vessel ….”178 
 
A straightforward reading of these definitions excludes semisubmersibles as 
“vessels,” by including them under “any drilling structure.”  The term “vessel” is 
restricted to watercraft used exclusively to “[transport] oil directly from an offshore 
facility.” Hence, the statement of the conferees:  
 
Vessels are separately defined and are separately treated under [title III]. 
However, once a drilling ship or other watercraft is attached to the seabed for 
exploration, development or production, it is to be considered an “offshore 
facility” rather than a vessel for purposes of applying the differing 
requirements for a facility as compared with a vessel.179 
 
But the basis for placing “drilling ships” within the “facility” and “offshore 
facility” categories is of far greater moment for this paper’s purposes. It is one and 
the same with that supporting Congress’s choice to strike the phrase “fixed 
structures” from section 1333(a)(1), and insert the phrase “and all installations and 
other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed.” Red Adair, the oil 
and gas industry’s premier blowout fireman, confirmed before the Ad Hoc Select 
Committee that semi-submersibles, which conduct exploration drilling, are more 
“dangerous” than production platforms, the fixed (production) structures of section 
1333(a)(2)(A).180 Reflecting the variety and frequency of and public outrage over 
                                                        
178 Title III, 301(8) (1978) (emphasis added).  A “facility” is a “structure, or group of 
structures (other than a vessel or vessels), used for the purpose of transporting, 
drilling for, producing, processing, storing, transferring, or otherwise handling oil.” 
Title III, sec. 301(7) (1978).  
179  H.R. Rep. 95-590, at 117 (1977) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1585.  To like effect is the passage immediately following the quote in text: 
[“The term ‘vessel’ covers] every description of watercraft or other contrivance, 
whether or not self-propelled, which is used to transport oil directly from an offshore 
facility. Once a vessel is operating in the navigable waters of the United States [i.e., 
landward from the OCS], it is not included in the title.” Id.at 118. (emphasis added). 
The special attention accorded vessels engaged in the transport of oil from offshore 
facilities likely reflects Congress’s agreement with then-Secretary of the Interior 
Andrus, who testified that these vessels are the “most dangerous things we have in 
the whole petroleum cycle.” Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1977, 
Part II: Hearings on H.R. 1614 before the Ad Hoc Select Committee on Outer 
Continental Shelf, 95th Cong. 1587 (1977)(Statement of Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary, 
Department of the Interior). 
180 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1977, Part II: Hearings on H.R. 
1614 Before the Ad hoc Select Committee on Outer Continental Shelf, 95th Cong. 875-
915 (1977) (response of Paul “Red’ Adair, Red Adair Oil Well Fires and Blowouts 
Control Co., Houston, TX to sequence of committee questions probing, inter alia, the 
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the scores of events from the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout to the most recent vessel 
spill, the Ad Hoc Select Committee explained the amendment’s purpose as follows:   
 
Section (a) amends section 4(a)(1) of the OCS Act of 1953 [now section 
1333(a)(1)] by changing the term ‘fixed structures‘ to ‘and all installations 
and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed‘ and 
making other technical changes. It is thus made clear that federal law is to be 
applicable to all activities on all devices in contact with the seabed for 
exploration, development, and production. The committee intends that federal 
law is, therefore, to be applicable to activities on drilling ships, semi-
submersible drilling rigs, and other watercraft, when they are connected to the 
seabed by drill string, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the OCS for 
exploration, development, or production purposes. Ships and vessels are 
specifically not covered when they are being used for the purpose of 
transporting OCS mineral resources.181 
 
2. The Gusher Issue and OCSLA ‘78 
 
 The Gusher Issue was dormant under OCSLA ’53 in light of the latter’s 
narrow focus on events occurring atop fixed structures. But it comes directly into 
play under OCSLA ‘78’s amendment adopting a regional orientation to encompass 
the prevention and policing of blowouts and oil spills. Does OCSLA ’78 extend its 
coverage to the Macondo oil and blowout’s effects beyond these situses? In an action 
seeking to establish liability for a maritime pollution incident’s economic losses, 
does it override the superadjacent water’s former status as an admiralty location? 
The Oppen decisions’ response to these queries was negative, but OCSLA ’78 calls for 
a different answer.  
 
 Congress’s authority to control OCSLA public lands and the oil is beyond 
question. Kleppe v. New Mexico182 ruled both that Congress’s property clause powers 
are “essentially limitless,”183 and that “Congress exercises the powers both of a 
proprietor and of a legislator over the public domain.”184 Kleppe sustained a federal 
statute protecting wild horses and burros on public lands against a state challenge 
asserting, inter alia, that public lands do not include their associated resources –in 
this case the wild animals.185 The analogy to OCSLA lands and the oil deriving from 
                                                                                                                                                                     
comparative danger of blowouts from semisubmersible vs. permanent platform 
drilling structures).   
181 H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at p. 68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.1450, 1534  
(capitalization by author).  
182 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
182 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
183 Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. County and City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 
29 (1940)). 
184 Id. at 540. 
185 Id. at 537. 
 39 
them is plain, although Macondo presents an even stronger case because the OCS, 
unlike New Mexico, is an exclusive federal enclave in which concurrent state 
legislation (not functioning as surrogate federal law) is barred. 
 
 But what about the claim of OCSLA’s continued control of the oil and 
activities associated with its policing once the oil leaves its original 53 ‘OCSLA sites? 
This issue is addressed in the now-classic Minnesota v. Block decision,186 which 
rejected a state challenge to Congress’s powers to control activities on state-owned 
areas in the context of a federal statute regulating and in some cases barring 
motorized recreational vehicles on state-owned portions of a national wilderness 
area. Block upheld the federal statute: “Congress’ power must extend to the 
regulation of conduct on or off the public lands that would threaten the designated 
purpose of federal lands.”187 It also applied a deferential standard to test the 
reasonableness of the controls adopted by Congress for this purpose.188 
 
 OCSLA ‘78’s legislative history confirms that its environmental controls, 
which are largely premised on the regional model, were adopted to minimize state 
and public objections to OCS drilling. Law suits, drilling moratoria and hostile public 
response overall to the drilling’s environmental consequences severely constrained 
OCSLA oil production to the detriment of the national economy, national defense 
and national revenues. Congress sought to overcome this hostility by means of 
OCSLA’s 78 amendments, an illustrative provision of which states that “operations 
on the outer Continental Shelf should be conducted in a safe manner… to prevent or 
minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well control, fire …or other occurrences 
which may cause damage to the environment or to property, or endanger life or 
health.”189 The effort to overcome these objections through such environmental 
assurances and the civil sanctions of OSLA 78’s “new statutory regime” fully 
comport with Block’s requirement of regulating conduct “off the public land that 
would threaten the designated purpose of [these] federal lands.”190 
 
The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged these values in decisions sustaining 
OCSLA jurisdiction under section 1349(b)(1) against objections that the activities in 
the pertinent dispute failed to arise out of “any operation” related to oil production 
on the OCS. Its leading decision upheld OCSLA jurisdiction to hear a suit concerning 
the “take-or-pay” and “minimum-take’ provisions of a natural gas sales contract. 191 
The court upheld jurisdiction, reasoning that 
  
                                                        
186 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). 
187 Id. at 1249. 
188 Id. at 1250 (“In reviewing the appropriateness of federal regulations… 
‘determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment 
of Congress.’”) (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536). 
189 43 U.S.C. sec. 1332(6) (2006).   
190 Block, 660 F.2d at 1249. 
191 Amoco Prod’n Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 844 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1988).   
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[t]he efficient exploitation of the minerals of the OCS, owned exclusively by 
the United States, was a primary reason for OCSLA. Just as clearly, any 
dispute that alters the progress of production activities on the OCS threatens  
to impair the total recovery of the federally owned minerals from the 
reservoir … underlying the OCS.192 
 
The court interpreted key OCSLA language in a manner designed to “effectuate the 
congressional grant of jurisdiction where that would enhance or achieve control of 
the natural resources by the national government.”193  
 
3. The Fifth Circuit and Macondo Models under OCSLA ‘78 
 
 This review of the OCSLA ’78 program supports this paper’s major themes. 
Congress’s exclusion of semisubmersibles from the OCSLA “vessel” category 
demonstrates that whether a watercraft is a “vessel” depends entirely upon the 
context and statute, if any, in issue. The status of Dutra’s “Super Scoop” barge in 
Boston Harbor under the LHWCA or Grubart’s spud barge on the Chicago River  
under general maritime law,194 therefore, in no way controls the status of the 
Deepwater Horizon atop the Gulf’s OCS under OCSLA or OPA. It merely commences 
what turns out to be a complex and, as the next section will reveal, very uncertain 
inquiry. Section 1333(a)(1), not section 1333(a)(2)(A), moreover, selects the 
pertinent law when federal non-admiralty statutes govern OCS operations, as OCSLA 
and its companion, OPA obviously do in the Macondo setting. Nor is federal law 
selection 1333(a)(1)’s sole function. The section also provides the flywheel driving  
OCSLA’s ‘78’s environmental and oil discharge liability program, and, as such, is a 
component of the substantive federal law selected.  Finally, unlike OCSLA-endorsed 
state law under section 1333(a)(2)(A), OCSLA’s federal law selections are immune 
from displacement by general maritime law.  
 
C. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase II  
 
Rodney Dangerfield Issue:  Dangerfield becomes Seinfeld. OCSLA section 
1333(a)(1) comes into its own both as a selector of the applicable federal statutes  
OCSLA and OPA, and as itself a source of substantive law through its inclusion of 
“temporarily attached” drilling platforms and its links to title III as well as to other 
OCSLA ‘78 provisions addressing OCSLA’s public lands and environmental advances.  
 
                                                        
192 Id. at 1210 
193 Id. at 1209, n. 25. In another opinion upholding OCSLA sec. 1349(1)(b) 
jurisdiction for the partition of co-owned OCS pipeline infrastructure, the Circuit 
stated that “resolution of these ownership rights would affect the efficient  
exploitation of resources from the OCS and/or threaten the total recovery of 
federally-owned resources.” E.P. Operating Ltd. Partn’s’p v. Placid Oil Co., 21 F.3rd 
563, 570 (5th Cir. 1994). 
194 See Grubart at 555 (1995) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
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Talisman Issue: OCSLA ’78 defines away the Deepwater Horizon’s status as a 
a “vessel” for admiralty purposes.  It is instead an OCS-located “offshore facility” 
because it functioned as an exploratory drilling platform when its drill string was 
attached to the Macondo well below.195 In the Lewis Carroll world of conventional, 
rather than ontological meaning, a mobile watercraft can morph into an “offshore 
facility” for law selection purposes, and indisputably has done so in OCSLA ’78.  
 
 Gusher Issue: Both the international community’s 1958 approval of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and Congress’s adoption of the regional ecological 
model negate Oppen’s conclusion that a blowout or spill commencing on an OCS 
situs becomes an admiralty tort once the discharge makes contact with 
superadjacent water. In obligating rather than simply permitting the littoral nation 
to adopt sanitary and pollution regulations for waters above its OCS region, article 
24 eliminated the concern earlier voiced by OCSLA ’53’s drafters that such measures 
would serve as a pretext for encroaching upon waters’ navigation or fishing 
freedoms.  Kleppe and Block validate Congress’s authority under the Property Clause 
to regulate public lands and contiguous areas in this manner. The anti-admiralty 
outcome of the Gusher Issue is fully in accord with the Supreme Court’s declaration 
in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire that “admiralty jurisdiction generally should 
not be extended to accidents in areas covered by OCSLA.”196   
 
Alien Issue: Scoring this issue is reserved for Phase III and the Conclusion.  
 
IV.  OCSLA PHASE III: Post-OPA ‘90 
 
A. Deepwater Horizon: A “Vessel” for post-OPA ‘90? 
 
Congress’s concurrent adoption of OPA and repeal of OCSLA title III in 1990 
while retaining OCSLA’s regional focus and its coverage of “temporarily attached” 
devices fog over a formerly clear picture, leaving pervasive uncertainty cutting both 
for and against admiralty jurisdiction. Arguably favoring this status for the 
Deepwater Horizon are three elements. One is OPA’s adoption of a definition for 
“vessel” that codifies the general maritime law concept.197 While debating OCSLA’s 
                                                        
195 See EEX Corp. v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2001), which 
observed that OCSLA ‘78’s shift to include vessels attached to the sea floor afforded OCSLA 
jurisdiction for the case at bar. The Court opined that  “under the Shelf Act, a vessel ceases 
to be a vessel the moment it attaches itself to the Shelf; it has become a tiny federal enclave 
not governed by international admiralty law.” Id. at 751 (citing Rodrigue, among other 
precedents).  
196 477 U.S. 207, 218 (1985) (emphasis added). The area “covered by” OCSLA ’78 for 
environmental purposes, of course, is broader than the area “covered by” OCSLA ’53 
for platform worker injuries, Tallentire’s issue. 
197 The House and Senate conferees agreed that OPA 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(37)’s 
definition of “vessel” is restated verbatim “from [current FWPCA section 1321(a)]” 
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’78 amendments, moreover, Congress was aware that an-OPA type bill was also 
underway, and expressly reserved freedom for itself to shape this eventual  measure 
in whatever fashion it wished.198 Finally, this same narrative bars an interpretation 
of OCSLA ’78 that modifies admiralty jurisdiction, rules or incidents.199 
 
But a contrary understanding of Congress’s concurrent adoption of OPA ‘90 
and repeal of title III is no less plausible. Having both committed itself so 
energetically to include “temporarily attached” watercraft as a substantive 
component of section 1333(a)(1) and left this language intact in 1990, it would 
seem anomalous for Congress abruptly to reverse course without explanation. Not 
only had Congress been instructed by Red Adair during the OCSLA ’78 hearings of 
the greater dangers posed by exploratory mobile platforms over fixed production 
platforms, 200 but Senators Chaffee, Lieberman, Durenberger and Graham appended 
a separate statement to the Senate’s 1990 OPA report201 emphasizing that well 
blowouts threaten discharges of far greater quantity than vessels. The subsequent 
Senate provision, which was enacted as OPA section 2703(c)(3), uncapped the 
liability of what OPA would term “Outer Continental Shelf offshore facilities.”202  
 
While the 1978 Congress denied an intent to bind its successors in fashioning 
future oil pollution legislation, neither did it urge that a subsequent Congress 
disown OCSLA ’78’s classification of semisubmersible or other mobile off-shore 
drilling units. On the contrary there is no evidence of Congress’s hostility to this 
classification; its retention of section 1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily attached” devices, of 
course, points in the contrary direction. What Congress sought, instead, was  
                                                                                                                                                                     
as are the terms “onshore facility” and “offshore facility.” H.R. Rep. No.101-653, at 2 
(1990) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779. 
198 The conferees agreed that they “‘do not in any way intend by the adoption of this 
title to affect consideration of, or approval of, any language in a comprehensive oil 
spill act…. The conferees expect that this title would be abrogated by the passage 
and enactment of such a comprehensive bill.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1474, at 677 (1978) 
(Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1739.   
199 The conferees clarified that it was not their intent  “to change the jurisdiction in 
incidents that are within the admiralty and maritime laws of the United States.” H.R. 
Rep. No. 101-653, at 58 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 838. 
200  See supra note 180 and accompanying text.   
201 See S. Rep. 101-94, at 26 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 748-
49 (separate statement of Senators Chaffee, Lieberman, Durenberger, and 
Graham). The senators warned that “[v]essels –even extremely large ones 
such as the Amoco Cadiz and the Exxon Valdez—carry finite supplies of oil 
and usually only a portion of the cargo is lost because it is 
compartmentalized…. [But] OCS [blowouts] … can involve prodigious and 
seemingly unlimited quantities of crude oil. The size of such spills can be 
enough to fill hundreds or even thousands of tankers the size of the Exxon 
Valdez.” Id. 
202 See 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(25) (2006) 
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consolidating within OPA the components of four separate maritime pollution 
statutes--  OCSLA,  FWPCA sec. 311, the Deepwater Port Act203 and the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline Authorization Act.204 Consolidation was designed to insure standardization 
of response cost and damages liability, and reduction of the inefficiencies of 
networking among multiple agencies, each interpreting separate statutes, 
formulating separate regulations and administering separate oil spill trust funds.205 
The conferees’ agreement that OPA does not modify admiralty jurisdiction or 
incidents is relevant only if the Macondo’s status as an admiralty tort post-OCSLA 
‘78 is conceded. But this is the very question being posed in these paragraphs. 
 
  Turning to OPA’s text for further direction, three OPA terms stand out: 
“mobile offshore drilling unit” (MODU); “offshore facility,” and “Outer Continental 
Shelf offshore facility.” OPA section 2701(18) defines  “mobile offshore drilling unit” 
(MODU), the only definition that unassailably applies to the Deepwater Horizon 
because the rig, a semi-submersible, qualifies as a MODU.  But is a MODU a “vessel”? 
Yes and no: the answer depends upon how the MODU is being used. As defined in 
section 2701(18), a MODU is categorized either as a “vessel,” or as “capable of use” 
as an “offshore facility.” But OPA section 2701(22) defines an “offshore facility,” the 
second definitional term, as “any facility of any kind located in, on or under any of 
the navigable waters of the United States… other than a “vessel.” Likewise excluding 
MODUs (when used as offshore facilities) from classification as vessels is OCSLA sec. 
1333(a)(1), which includes them within its “temporarily attached” device group. To 
like effect are the Coast Guard’s navigational aid regulations, which include MODUs  
as “structures” which are defined to include “fixed structures, temporary or 
permanent ,” a category that encompasses “mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) 
when attached to the [OCS] bottom.” 206 
 
OPA’s third term, section 2701(25)’s “Outer Continental Shelf facility,” cannot 
be overlooked because it is one of only two OPA title I provisions207 that even 
mention the OCS. It is defined as “an offshore facility which is located … on the Outer 
Continental Shelf and is or was used for any of the following purposes :  exploring 
                                                        
203 Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-6278, 88 Stat. 2126 (1975), at 33 
U.S.C. secs. 1501-24 (2006).  
204 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L., No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (1973), 
at 43 U.S.C. secs. 1651 et. seq. (2006).  
205 The Senate Report observed that the existing oil spill programs “provide varying 
and uneven liability standards and scope of coverage for clean-up costs and 
damages associated with activities covered by each individual law. Moreover, the 
array of …programs can create administrative problems as well. As a result the goal 
of compensating those injured may be complicated by questions of the jurisdiction 
of various federal agencies.” Senate Report 101-94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 725.  
206 See U.S. Coast Guard, AIDS to Navigation on Artificial Islands and Fixed 
Structures, 33 C.F.R. sec. 67-01-5 (2004).  
207 33 U.S.C. sec. 2704(c)(3)(2006) is the other. 
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for, drilling for, producing … or transporting oil produced from the Outer 
Continental Shelf.” Striking verbal parallels link this characterization to former 
OCSLA title III sec, 301(8)’s term “offshore facility,” which is also identified as a 
“drilling structure … used to drill for, produce … or transport oil produced from the 
Outer Continental Shelf.”208 But the OCSLA offshore facility encompasses watercraft 
used as drilling platforms so long as they do not transport oil from OCS offshore 
facilities. OPA’s “Outer Continental Shelf facility,” in contrast, excludes “vessels” as 
defined in 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(18) (2006).  
 
There is, however, a further wrinkle. In supporting the view expressed by the 
four senators negating a cap on response costs for OCS operations, OPA sec. 
2703(c)(3) duplicates  the parallelism of OPA “Outer Continental Shelf offshore 
facilities” with OCSLA “offshore facilities.” It divides into mutually exclusive 
categories the (OPA) “ Outer Continental Shelf facility” from “a vessel carrying oil as 
cargo from such a facility,” the latter of which, of course, rules the Deepwater 
Horizon out as a “vessel.” Reinforcing the interpretation that OCS facilities and 
vessels are mutually exclusive categories are Coast Guard regulations that define the 
term “Outer Continental Shelf facility” as 
 
[a]ny artificial island, installation or other device permanently or temporarily 
attached to the subsoil or seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf, erected for 
the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom, 
or any such installation or other device (other than a ship or vessel) for the 
purpose of transporting for such resources.. The term includes mobile offshore 
drilling units when in contact with the seabed of the OCS for exploration or 
exploitation of subsea resources.209 
 
Only two confident conclusions can be drawn from this definitional labryinth, 
neither of which aids the inquiry. First, Congress has not clarified the extent to 
which its denial of admiralty jurisdiction for “temporarily attached” drilling 
platforms in OCSLA ’78 survives or perishes in consequence of title III’s repeal by 
OPA ’90. Resolving the confusion should be a first order of business in the post-
Macondo blowout restructuring of OCSLA and OPA called for by the Presidential 
Commission.210 Second, the eventual resolution of the issue for the Macondo dispute 
will confirm the accuracy of John Chipman Gray’s observation that “statutes do not 
interpret themselves; their meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with this 
meaning … that they are imposed upon the community as Law.”211  
                                                        
208 Title III, sec. 301(8) (1978) (emphasis added).  A “facility” is a “structure, or 
group of structures (other than a vessel or vessels), used for the purpose of 
transporting, drilling for, producing, processing, storing, transferring, or otherwise 
handling oil.” Id. at sec. 301(7).  
209 See U.S. Coast Guard OCS Activities, Subpart A, sec. 140.10 (2004) (emphasis 
added). 
210 President’s Report, Part III: Lessons Learned. 
211 The Nature and Sources of the Law 170 (Gaunt Reprint 1999) (1909). 
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B . From Rodrigue to Executive Jet to Grubart:  The Fusion of OCSLA and 
Admiralty Analysis 
 
1. From Executive Jet to Grubart 
 
  Executive Jet has been followed to date by three further opinions refining the 
substantial relationship principle. The first, Foremost Insurance Company v. 
Richardson,212 extended Executive Jet to vessels, announcing that only those 
maritime torts involving vessels in navigable waters that satisfy the Executive Jet 
test under circumstances threatening disruption of maritime commerce qualify as 
maritime torts.213 Hence, even if the Deepwater Horizon were a “vessel” and the 
discharge of its oil into the OCS’s subjacent waters were a tort, admiralty 
jurisdiction would not apply unless the semisubmersible’s activity, OCS exploratory 
operations, satisfies the test.  
 
This point is lost on those who conflate the independent requirements of 
location and of the substantial relationship link when they insist that ocean drilling 
conducted from a vessel engages admiralty jurisdiction.214 The ocean and vessel 
elements address location; the fact that drilling is conducted from an ocean vessel 
does not, by itself, establish compliance with the substantial relation test. The latter 
is not satisfied unless exploitation of OCS resources through exploration, 
development or production bears the requisite link to a traditional maritime 
activity.  
 
The second post-Executive Jet decision, Sisson v. Ruby,215 essentially 
recapitulates the former two opinions to require, in addition to the locational 
requirements of vessel and waters, that the general features of the incident causing 
the harm must threaten to disrupt maritime commerce, and that the general 
character of the activity from which the incident arose must show a substantial 
relation to a traditional maritime activity. Grubart, the last of the Executive Jet line to 
date, confirms the application of these principles, describing the relational test met 
                                                        
212 457 U.S. 668 (1982). 
213 Id. at 675.  
214 Hence, Grubart’s observation that “[b]ecause the injuries suffered by Grubart and 
the other flood victims were caused by a vessel on navigable water, the location 
enquiry would seem to be at an end …” Grubart at 535 (emphasis added). The opinion 
then addresses the substantial relationship test as a separate issue. Id. at 538-48. 
Illustrative of the distinction is the Fifth Circuit’s own opinion in AmClyde, discussed 
infra Part IV B.2. in which a tortious event occurring on one and, arguably two, 
vessels on high seas and extending to a partially constructed fixed drilling platform 
above the OCS was deemed to fall short of admiralty jurisdiction because the OCS 
“operation” being pursued in the event was found not to be “substantially related to 
a traditional maritime activity.” 
215 497 U.S. 358 (1990)  
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when “the tortfeasor’s activity … on navigable waters is so closely related to activity 
traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty 
rules would apply in the suit at hand.”216 The Court also observed that if the incident 
features multiple parties as tortfeasors, admiralty jurisdiction is secured so long as 
the activity of one party meets the relational test and is the incident’s proximate 
cause.217 
 
Earlier discussion of the Oppen decisions following the Santa Barbara OCS 
blowout observed that they were outdated in two respects that can now be 
addressed. Their view that the activity to be connected to the traditional maritime 
activity is that of the damaged party rather than of the tortfeasor218 is clearly at 
odds with the Court’s four decisions. Likewise erroneous is their position on the 
Gusher Issue that movement of the oil from the OCS floor into the waters above  
transformed the blowout into a general maritime event. This position fails upon  
OCSLA ’78’s adoption, which enlarged OCSLA’s venue for environmental and civil 
liability purposes from platforms themselves to the contiguous region.219  
 
Turning to Grubart’s requirements overall, a forceful claim can be made that 
The Macondo blowout satisfies only the disruption of maritime commerce element. 
the blowout, of course, not only threatened to but actually did disrupt maritime 
commerce. But the impediments to classifying the Deepwater Horizon as a “vessel” 
are imposing, as evidenced throughout this paper. An even greater struggle is 
undoubtedly in the offing should the Supreme Court be asked to rule on Grubart’s 
requirement that the “general character of the activity giving rise to the incident”220 
–exploratory drilling for oil and gas on the OCS—is “so closely related to activity 
traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty 
rules would apply in the suit at hand.”221  
 
Two considerations explain why a struggle is likely for an inquiry that is 
unconstrained by the Fifth Circuit’s OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) jurisprudence. 
The first is the combination of both Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s dour view 
of the supposed maritime character of OCS drilling. Macondo may provide the 
scenario through which, ironically, the OCSLA-based tug of war between the 
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit finds its resolution within Executive Jet’s 
admiralty-limiting venue. The second is that Macondo differs from the Court’s four 
“substantial relationship” cases in relation to the consideration most likely to 
                                                        
216 Grubart at 539-40 (emphasis added.) 
217 In Macondo, BP does not satisfy this requirement because its well is an OCSLA 
situs and because the Gusher Issue resolves against admiralty jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the focus throughout this paper has been on the Deepwater Horizon.  
218 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1974); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. 
Co, 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973). 
219 See infra Part III.B.2. 
220 Grubart at 539 
221 Id. at 539-40. 
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determine the inquiry’s outcome: namely, that Congress itself has essentially 
prepackaged the factual and policy grounds upon which a negative decision should 
rest. The burden of sustaining this endeavor will not fall upon the judiciary alone, 
therefore, as it has in the Court’s four preceding struggles with the inquiry.    
 
Concisely and authoritatively, Congress has framed the Grubart-required 
description of the “general character of the activity giving rise to the incident“222 by 
its half-century of deliberations on OCSLA ’53 through OCSLA ’90, followed by 16 
years of similar deliberations leading to OPA. This process has distilled a consistent, 
logical and fully transparent conception of OCS drilling operations as Macondo’s 
underlying activity. The description is one and the same with OCSLA section 
1349(b)(1)’s definition of the basis for OCSLA subject matter jurisdiction: namely, 
“any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, 
development or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer 
Continental Shelf.” This definition mirrors, in turn, OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s 
targeting of activities undertaken “for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or 
producing resources [from the OCS seabed],” as further delimited by OCSLA section 
1331’s specification of the terms “exploration,” “development,” and “production” 
respectively.223  
 
My omission of section 1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily attached” devices and of 
section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s “fixed structures” is deliberate because the substantial 
relationship test focuses on the activity being conducted by the Deepwater Horizon, 
not on whether this exploratory oil drilling rig merits classification as temporarily 
attached or fixed.224  
                                                        
222 Id. 
223 43 U.S.C. secs. 1331(k) (exploration), (l) (development), and (m) (production), 
respectively.  
224 Not only has Congress provided this definitive characterization, but the Macondo 
MDL proceedings have already yielded a determination that the Macondo blowout 
does indeed fall within these parameters as expressed in OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 
1349(b)(1) (2006) and supplemented in Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. See In re Oil 
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” MDL No. 2179, 747 F.Supp.2d 704 (E.D. La. 
2010) (Barbier, J.). 
Declining to remand to state court an action BP had removed to the Eastern District 
of Louisiana, Judge Barbier ruled that the Macondo incident accorded with the 
section because it was an “operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf, 
which involved the exploration and production of minerals.” Id. at 709.  He added 
that the Circuit has clarified that “[t]hese terms denote respectively the processes 
involved in searching for minerals on the OCS; preparing to extract them by, inter 
alia, drilling wells and constructing platforms; and removing the minerals and 
transferring them to shore.” Id. (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. 
Co., 87 F.3rd 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1996)). All that remains to complete the picture is to 
conclude that OCSLA not only provides jurisdiction for the dispute, but also specifies 
the governing law, in accordance not only with the reasoning set forth supra Part 
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2. AmClyde: From Executive Jet/Grubart back to OCSLA/Rodrigue 
 
 The functional linkage of Rodrigue to Executive Jet was earlier identified in a 
passage suggesting that the OCSLA’s liberation from the Fifth Circuit’s “of its own 
force”  and “other Federal laws” devices might render it even more potent than had 
the Fifth  Circuit accorded the statute the standing that it concedes OCSLA’s  
legislative history warrants.225 Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. v. AmClyde 
Engineered Products Company 226 (AmClyde) illustrates this scenario. If fused with 
section 1333(a)(2)(A), the Executive Jet/Grubart test renders the OCSLA-endorsed 
state law candidate a well-armored admiralty opponent .  
 
 Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering Corp.227 (UTP) routinized the 
section 1333(a)(2)(A) exercise as a three-step process. It favors OCSLA’s preference 
over admiralty jurisdiction and law selection only upon demonstration of an OCSLA 
situs (Step 1), the non-application of admiralty law of its own force (Step 2), and the 
consistency of the OCSLA-endorsed state law with “other Federal laws.” (Step 3). 
Independent of OCSLA, on the other hand, admiralty law will not apply absent 
demonstration of the Executive Jet/ Grubart relationship linkage.  
 
 How might the Fifth Circuit universe change if the Executive Jet/Grubart test 
were substituted for the former Step 2?  AmClyde instructs that it would change in 
two significant respects: namely, that the “of its own force” and “other Federal laws” 
dodges would not overcome OCSLA, and that the presence of a vessel in the 
situational mix would not, of itself, support admiralty jurisdiction.  
 
 AmClyde was a combined negligence/products liability action brought by  
Texaco against a variety of defendants including AmClyde Engineeering, the 
successor to a company that designed the main load line of a crane that failed, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
II.C.1, but as also expressed in EP Operating Ltd. Ptns’p v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3rd 563, 
570 (5th Cir. 1994). “OCSLA casts a broad substantive net in section 1333,” and 
“instructs that ‘the jurisdictional grant of section 1349 should be read co-extensively 
reach of section 1333.’” Id. at 569 (emphasis added).  Since it is beyond question that 
the federal statutes, OCSLA and OPA afford the applicable law for the economic 
losses occasioned by the Macondo dispute, the complications posed elsewhere by 
OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) arise, if at all, only in conjunction with the 
“mini-gap” issue posed supra Part II.E.  
225 See supra TAN 72. 
226 Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n Inc . v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., 448 F.3rd 
760, 770-71 (5th Cir. 2006), amended on rehearing, Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n Inc v. 
AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., 453 F.3rd 652 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc. v. Texaco Explor’n and Prod’n, Inc., 549 U.S. 
1053 (2006) [hereinafter AmClyde]. 
227 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848 (1990). 
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plunging into the sea a deck module being fitted to the support frame of a partially 
constructed, fixed oil production platform. Two vessels were featured at least as 
prominently featured in this tort as the Deepwater Horizon was in the Macondo 
blowout. One was the materials barge from which the derrick crane lifted the deck 
module. The other was the DB-50, the barge on which the crane was positioned and 
from which it had to swing the deck module some 1500 feet to reach the platform 
site.  
 
The court rebuffed an admiralty-based challenge to OCSLA jurisdiction. It 
observed that the project’s purpose –constructing a facility that would conduct OCS 
drilling production activities--  aligned squarely with an OCSLA “operation”  under 
OCSLA section 1349(b)(1).  It then held that admiralty jurisdiction was not 
supported by dispute’s facts. “To the extent that maritime activities surround the 
construction work underlying the complaint,” the court stated, “any connection to 
maritime law is eclipsed by the construction’s connection to the development of the 
Outer Continental Shelf.228 
 
The court then turned to the law selection exercise under section 
1333(a)(2)(A), utilizing the UTP three-step test for this task. It quickly affirmed the 
dispute’s compliance with Step 1 on the basis that that the permanent platform 
qualified as an OCSLA situs. 
 
 Under conventional 1333(a)(2)(A), analysis, virtual givens in light of the 
presence of the dispute’s two vessels were Step Two’s findings of concurrent 
admiralty jurisdiction followed by overlapping OCSLA and admiralty jurisdiction, 
and completed by admiralty’s rout of OCSLA on grounds of jurisdictional overlap 
and of the “other Federal laws” and “of its own force” devices. Instead, the court 
upset these well-settled expectations by opting to substitute for conventional 
analysis a fusion of Executive Jet/Grubart with Rodrigue /OCSLA. Negating admiralty 
law’s selection, the court stated that “[t]he DB-50’s involvement in the accident and 
other elements of maritime activity that proceed or surround the [platform’s] 
construction on the Shelf are insufficient to support either admiralty jurisdiction or 
the application of substantive maritime law.”229 It declared the back door closed to 
admiralty law: “maritime law cannot apply of its own force because there is an 
insufficient connection between the underlying tort and traditional maritime 
activity.”230  
 
 Macondo does not need AmClyde to credibly challenge admiralty jurisdiction 
as inappropriate under Executive Jet grounds. But a comparison of the two scenarios 
is provocative nonetheless because they are united by striking factual similarities. 
Both present watercraft in prominent roles: AmClyde features a materials barge, and 
the DB-50, a derrick barge. Macondo has the Deepwater Horizon. Both have 
                                                        
228 AmClyde at 771. 
229 Id. at 775. 
230 Id. at 774. 
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undoubted OCSLA situses: AmClyde’s fixed platform and Macondo’s OCSLA subsoil 
and seabed oil and gas well. And both are pursuing the same OCS “operation”: 
exploitation of the OCS for oil production. There are, of course, differences between 
two that distance Macondo even further from admiralty than AmClyde. Macondo 
engages predominantly federal statutes –OCSLA and OPA -- not the OCSLA-endorsed 
state law on which Texaco relied.  Conceding the Deepwater Horizon’s not 
insignificant role in Macondo, the DB-50 was even more prominent in the AmClyde 
tort as the situs upon which the attached derrick crane failed. Conversely, the 
Macondo well merits top billing over the Deepwater Horizon. The well generated 4.9 
million barrels of oil and its blowout caused the Deepwater Horizon’s incineration 
and discharge of a mere six/ten thousandths of the total amount of the event’s oil.  
 
C.  Scorecard: OCSLA Phase III (Post-1990) 
 
 Rodney Dangerfield Issue:  OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s standing with respect 
to the selection and application of federal law remains unchanged. Likewise 
unchanged is its inclusion of “temporarily attached” drilling platforms. But whether 
this language will have the same or similar force in conjunction with OPA (either 
directly or as an interpretational aid for the latter) as it enjoyed in conjunction with 
former title III is unclear. Even if it does not, however, the continued vigor of the 
section’s “temporarily attached” language counts against the conclusion that the 
Macondo tort satisfies Executive Jet’s (non-OCSLA) substantial relationship criterion.     
 
 Talisman Issue:  The outcome of this issue will likely depend upon how the 
judiciary regards the plasticity of terms such as MODU, which may connote a 
“vessel” pure and simple or which, when “use[d] as an offshore facility” assumes the 
character of the latter. Also influential will be whether OPA sec. 2703(c)(3)’s 
dichotomy between an ”Outer Continental Shelf facility” and a “vessel carrying oil as 
cargo from such a facility” is deemed to replicate OCSLA’s definition of an “offshore 
facility” which clearly includes semisubmersibles like the Deepwater Horizon, but 
excluded oil-transporting vessels. Nor can Section 1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily 
attached” language be disregarded on the faulty premise that OPA has repealed it by 
implication in the same measure –OPA--that Congress employed expressly to repeal 
title III. It remains to be seen whether Amclyde’s dismissal of the materials and DB-
50 barges as background noise will be honored in future Fifth Circuit decisions. 
AmClyde does demonstrate, however, both Executive Jet’s power to trump the Fifth 
Circuit’s conventional section 1333(a)(2)(A) analysis within the familiar UTP 3-step 
format, and the distinction between its test’s locational (vessel/navigable waters) 
and purpose (link of the venture underlying the tort with a “traditional maritime 
activity”) components.  
 
 Gusher Issue: OPA does not supplant OCSLA’s non-repealed provisions 
framing its regional environmental framework.  The Gusher Issue’s status continues, 
therefore, as stated in the 1978 Scorecard. The Oppen opinions’ contrary position 
should not prevail. 
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 Alien Issue: The preceding observations regarding the challenges Macondo 
faces satisfying the substantial relationship test caution that the latter will prove 
even more threatening to admiralty jurisdiction than the Deepwater Horizon’s 
status as an “Outer Continental Shelf offshore facility.” In combination, the two 
objections will prove formidable, perhaps even insuperable.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Executive Jet’s substantial relationship principle has played a prominent role 
in this paper’s inquiry. It is fitting, therefore, to conclude by asking how criticisms of 
the principle overall231 measure up against the test’s use in the Macondo setting. 
The conclusion here is that it holds up admirably if Grubart’s qualification is 
respected that the “test turns on the comparison of traditional maritime activity to 
the arguably maritime character of the tortfeasor’s activity in a given case….”232 An 
examination of the criticisms reflects that applying the test in Macondo’s tightly 
framed OCS “operations” setting either avoids the problems that more open-ended 
settings are claimed to present, or generates benefits that outweigh the costs of 
abandoning the former brightline location rule.    
 
 The criticisms selected are represented by the overlapping concerns voiced 
by Judge Posner in Tagliere v. Harrah’s Illinois Corporation,233 Justice Scalia in Sisson 
v. Ruby234 and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, in Grubart.235 Four in number,  
the first asserts that the loss is indefensible because the test is likely to be required 
only for “rare freakish cases.”236 In characteristically colorful phrasemaking, Justice 
Scalia speaks of torts that fail the test as “exotic actions [that] appear more 
frequently in the theoretical musings of the ‘thoroughbred admiralty men’… than in 
the federal reports.”237 
 
To describe the Macondo blowout as a “rare freakish event,” however, would 
be perverse. The President’s Commission reports that from 1996 to 2009 in the 
United States Gulf of Mexico alone there were 79 reported cases of loss of well 
control accidents, which occur when hydrocarbons flow uncontrolled either 
underground or at the surface.238 It is true that litigated OCS oil well blowouts have 
                                                        
231 See authorities cited supra note 65. 
232 Grubart at 542. 
233 445 F.3rd 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). 
234 497 U.S. 358, 368 (1990( Scalia, J., concurring).  
235 Grubart at 549 (Thomas J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring). 
236 Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. at 358 (1990) (Scalia, J.). See also Grubart at 555 
(‘freakish cases, Thomas J.); Tagliere at 1014 (7th Cir. 2006 ) (“freak cases,” Posner, 
J.).  
237 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 374.  
238 See President’s Report at p. 226-29 for a tabular listing of each event.  The report 
recounts the general history of 20th Century American oil spills, well blowouts, and 
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been rare, but they are hardly “freakish.” On the contrary, the risk of the devastating 
consequences that have become a reality throughout the Gulf following the Macondo 
blowout has been the subject of decades of sustained, apprehensive Congressional 
attention. Uncertainty whether, where and when there will be another Macondo-
type blowout must be measured against the frightening magnitude of a multi-
million barrel event. Unfortunately it is a risk that will only increase as future wells 
are drilled even deeper, further out to sea, and in less hospitable environments than 
the Gulf.239  
 
The second objection relates to who will make the call on the test. The matter 
would not be controversial at all if the task were assigned to Congress.  Justice 
Thomas, for example, would not likely complain as he did in Grubart that leaving the 
matter to judges “may permit judicial power to reach beyond its constitutional and 
statutory limits, or … discourage judges from hearing disputes properly before 
them.”240  Whether or not this criticism is persuasive in non-OCS contexts, however, 
it is of little consequence in the Macondo OCSLA setting where the framework for a 
disciplined evaluation of the call has already engaged Congress at the deepest policy 
and substantive level.  Congress and a score of technically proficient federal 
agencies have spent decades defining policies and practices for management and 
governance of OCS oil drilling operations. The courts, therefore, enjoy guidance that 
is as well-framed for pronouncing on the question in this “given case” as they enjoy 
in other spheres featuring similar Congressional policy review and draftsmanship 
and federal agency rulemaking.   
 
This conclusion is not undermined by the turbulence in Fifth Circuit OCS 
decisions noted both within the Circuit 241 and in commentary.242 The disorder is 
more likely a result of the Circuit’s self-acknowledged disinclination243 to honor the 
guidance afforded by OCSLA’s legislative history as amplified in the pertinent 
Supreme Court opinions. The problem, in short, does not lie with the substantial 
relationship test, which, in the OCS drilling context, functions as a restraint upon, 
not an enabler of unduly expansive admiralty jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
the disruptive effects of hurricanes and other natural disasters on platform 
construction and drilling in Chapters 2-6.   
239 See id. at 294. 
240 Grubart at 549.   
241 Illustrative is the plaint of one Fifth Circuit judge addressing a 43 U.S.C. sec. 
1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) problem: “In each new case, a panel of this court must comb 
through a bewildering array of cases that rely upon inconsistent reasoning in the 
hope of finding an identical fact situation. Absent en banc reconciliation, cases thus 
are decided on what seems to be a random factual basis.” Smith v. Penrod Drilling 
Corp., 960 F. 2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1992) overruled on other grounds, Grand Isle 
Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009).  
242 For an exhaustive collection of widely divergent Fifth Circuit cases in what 
Professor Robertson terms this “infamously chaotic” sphere, see Mistakes at 480.   
243 See supra note 47.  
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Closely related to the second question is the third: whether judges will be 
able to fashion rules for the substantial relationship test without increasing  
“complication and uncertainty,244 introducing “disruption and confusion,”245 or  
rendering the jurisdiction determination “hopelessly uncertain.”246 Staying focused 
on the “given case,” the same considerations that overcame the preceding objection 
apply forcefully to this one as well. Congress has already defined criteria pursuant to 
which jurisdictional lines should be drawn respecting OCS “operations.”247  The 
judiciary’s role, therefore, is closely tethered to and necessarily conducted within a 
framework precisely delineated by these criteria.   
 
The final objection achieves crisp statement in Judge Posner’s dictate that 
“the most important requirement of a jurisdictional rule is not that it appeals to 
common sense but that it be clear.”248 He proposes as an alternative basis the 
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act,249 which establishes admiralty jurisdiction 
independent of the “substantial relationship” requirement.  He acknowledges, 
however, his position’s conflict with the Act’s legislative history, the contrary 
decisions of other circuits, and the Supreme Court’s refusal to rule one way or the 
other on the question. Nonetheless, he continued 
 
[w]e do not think that the [Act’s] legislative history should override (its] 
broad statutory language, which provides a clear and simple jurisdictional 
test for cases like this in contrast to the vague ‘maritime nexus’ (or 
‘connection’) test … that is used to determine jurisdiction under section 
1333(1)….”250 
 
The persuasiveness of Judge Posner’s reasoning is contingent upon the 
context in which it, along with the arguments of Justices Scalia and Thomas, is 
offered: namely, a clash between the competing claims for jurisdiction and law 
selection in which the candidates are general maritime or admiralty law and state 
law. But Macondo’s context opposes federal non-admiralty statutory law to judge-
made general maritime law. Delaval counsels that the presence of a federal statute 
resets the question.251  Consequently, Judge Posner’s cost/benefit analysis –clarity 
over common sense to avoid replacing simplicity with complexity in determining 
jurisdiction- must be revised to take into account other variables introduced by 
OCSLA and OPA, the Macondo context’s federal statutes. 
 
                                                        
244 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 387 (Scalia, J.). 
245 Grubart at 1015 (Thomas J.) 
246 Tagliere, 445 F. 3rd at 1015 (Posner, J). 
247 OCSLA sec. 1349(b)(1). See TAN 223-24 supra. 
248 Tagliere, 445 F.3rd at 1013.  
24946 U.S.C. sec. 30101 (2006).   
250 Tagliere, 445 F.3rd at 1014. 
251 See TAN 53 supra. 
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A shift to the Macondo context brings to light a variety of costs avoided by 
the substantial relationship inquiry that are incurred by choosing “clarity” over 
“common sense.” Most have already been addressed in this paper, starting with 
dishonoring the Congressional intent reflected in OCSLA ‘53’s legislative history as 
further elaborated in pertinent Supreme Court opinions. But others merit attention 
as well. Unduly broad assertions of admiralty jurisdiction cost the states their 
opportunity to participate in matters peripheral to admiralty’s central concerns. 
Since admiralty jurisdiction in the general maritime law vs. state law contests 
typically begets the application of substantive admiralty law, these claims frustrate 
Congress’s recognition that OCSLA platform workers’ social welfare needs are best 
secured by OCSLA-endorsed state law under section 1333(a)(2)(A).  
 
Within Macondo’s context, moreover, Judge Posner’s clarity is achieved not 
by the application of Occam’s razor –the excision of spurious or redundant claims-- 
but by expunging vital elements demanded for the inquiry’s rational pursuit. One 
such element evident throughout this paper is zeroing out OCSLA/OPA’s 
environmental values as indispensable components of any analysis of Macondo’s 
jurisdictional basis, while isolating the “vessel” question as though its outcome has 
nothing to do with these values or their means of implementation. Another is the 
opportunity to address the fundamental issue of rationality that Executive Jet boldly 
and properly sets forth: what are the components of a proper fit between a dispute’s 
content and the appropriateness of its resolution under admiralty rules and 
procedures?  
 
A difficult question to be sure, and one whose response must be acutely 
sensitive to the dispute’s context. But it needs to be asked if the venture is to claim 
any pretense of rationality. When pursued in the Macondo context, the following 
questions present themselves: 
 
Is it rational to assimilate the Deepwater Horizon MODU to a general 
maritime law “vessel” in light of the astonishing technological transformation of oil 
drilling technology and infrastructure that has radically increased the risk of these 
disasters in just the last 30 years?252 
 
Is it rational to apply judge-made maritime tort rules to govern the Macondo 
blowout in view of the conflicting values and constituencies that shaped these rules, 
on the one side, and OCSLA ’78 and OPA, on the other?253   
                                                        
252  See President’s Commission at 32-53. As only one example of infrastructure 
innovation, the Report features a mock-up of Shell Oil’s Auger fixed oilfield platform 
that, in spatial scope, dwarfs New Orleans entire central business district, the 
contiguous Mississippi River and the adjoining West Bank. Id. at 39. 
253 The differences reflect a shift from the 18th and 19th century’s dominance of the 
values of shippers and insurers abetted by the nation’s desire to nurture its 
maritime commerce to the last-third of the 20th century’s embrace of environmental 
values that forced the radical accommodations found in OCSLA ’78 and OPA. 
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Is it rational to assume that judges can or should seek to cope with the 
complexity and pace of technological, economic and attitudinal changes documented 
in this paper through general maritime law rule-making, when Congress and scores 
of federal agencies have had continuously to revise their posture toward the 
pollution and environmental consequences of OCS drilling operations, and appear 
poised to do so for the fourth time in a half century? 
  
Is it rational to assume that admiralty law --a “very limited body of customs 
and ordinances of the sea,” according to Justice Holmes”254--  ever possessed or 
possesses now the jurisprudential genes required to achieve the necessary fit with 
the complex demands of OCS governance?255 
 
Finally, is it rational to assume that if these questions are approached from 
an admiraltycentric perspective, they will yield to any other than an 
admiraltycentric response?256 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Illustrative are the latters’ broader liability rules, lesser liability limitations, and 
broader categories of aggrieved parties and damages (e.g., economic loss 
disassociated from owner property damage, environmental resource damages, 
streamlined damaged claim procedures, new classes of third-party plaintiffs, and 
expanded insurer exposure). For a detailed account of these shifts, see Lawrence 
Kiern, supra note 61. 
254 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 235 (1917) (Holmes J., dissenting). 
255 Pertinent to a response is Justice Marshall’s statement’s that “the demand for tidy 
rules can go too far, and when that demand entirely divorces the jurisdictional 
inquiry from the purposes that support the exercise of jurisdiction, it has gone too 
far.” Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. at 364, n. 2.  
256 This paper has evaluated its principal issues and themes as an exercise in legal 
method, constitutional and statutory interpretation and jurisprudence derived from 
pertinent federal legislation and Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions. An 
equally cogent approach might evaluate admiralty’s claim for jurisdictional priority 
over OCS operations as a struggle for institutional primacy that calls to mind 
England’s brass-knuckle, centuries-long warfare between common law and equity 
or, indeed, common law and admiralty. For the latter, see David Robertson, 
Admiralty and Federalism 43-64 (1970). It is no denigration of legal process to 
suggest that extra-legal competitive dynamics may have something to do with the 
following outcomes, among others, considered in this paper: the Fifth Circuit’s 
treatment of personal injury torts atop drilling platforms as admiralty torts for 16 
years following the enactment of OCSLA ’53 on the basis of a construction of the Act 
in Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F. 2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961) that utterly ignores its legislative 
history; the neutering of OCSLA post-Rodrigue; the reluctance to concede law 
selection, law application or substantive force to OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) prior to 
or following OCSLA ’78; the pre-Herb’s Welding inclusion of OCS drilling operations 
as LHWCA “maritime commerce”; or Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC, 
589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009), which, in overruling decisions that select and apply 
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ADDENDUM: B-1 Bundle Rulings 
 
Immediately prior to the submission of this paper for publication, Judge 
Barbier handed down an “Order and Reasons” concerning the Macondo MDL  
Plaintiffs’ “B-1” Master Complaint, Defendants’ Motions to  Dismiss, and the 
Plaintiffs’ Oppositions.257 The B-1 “Bundle” includes various categories of plaintiffs 
pressing over 100,000 individual claims of diverse forms of economic loss damages 
under general maritime law, OPA, and various state laws. The rulings hue to the 
admiraltycentric outcomes driven by the Fifth Circuit model,258 a result at the trial 
level that does not surprise given the force of the appellant precedents binding upon 
the District Court. With the Transocean Concursus action already set as the first of 
the MDL actions, 259 moreover, a ruling denying the Macondo’s status as an 
admiralty tort was unlikely, as earlier intimated.260 
 
Limitations of space and time preclude attention to reviewing the full battery 
of the court’s rulings or to detailed consideration of the two that are addressed here. 
The first declares that the Deepwater Horizon is a “vessel,” “as that term is defined 
and understood in general maritime law.”261 The second, that the Macondo OCS 
operation satisfies the Executive Jet/Grubart “substantially related to a traditional 
maritime activity” requirement.262 Only summary discussion of these two rulings is 
called for in any event because both were anticipated and their pros and cons 
precisely detailed in the paper’s body.      
 
The court’s first ruling proceeds from two deficient premises. One is that the 
concept of a “vessel” is generic throughout admiralty law rather than a creature of 
the particular governing statute in question, if such there be, that includes or 
excludes watercraft on the basis of stated criteria. OCSLA, of course, fulfills this role, 
along with OPA, in the Macondo setting. Despite the OCSLA/OPA combine, the B1 
Bundle ruling draws randomly from and treats generically the status of specialized 
                                                                                                                                                                     
tort “law of the locus” rather than contract “focus of the contract” principles to 
indemnity actions arising from tortious personal injuries, increases the likelihood 
that admiralty law will be preferred over OCSLA-endorsed state law in these 
contests. If the Supreme Court’s declaration is taken seriously that OCSLA 
incorporates Congress’s intent that “admiralty treatment [be] eschewed altogether,” 
Rodrigue at 365 n.12, Executive Jet does valuable service in requiring that the issues 
posed in this paper, no less than OCSLA itself, be taken seriously as well. 
257 In re: Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 
2010, MDL No. 2179, Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Doc. 3830 (E.D. La. 2011) 
[hereinafter B1 Bundle]. 
258 This model is outlined supra Part I.B.1. 
259 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
260 See infra TAN 14. 
261 B1 Bundle at 4.  
262 B1 Bundle at 8. 
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watercraft in Jones Act,263 LHWCA264 and OCS265 settings. OCSLA’s legislative 
history, text amendments,  and interpretation by federal agencies demand a 
different approach as amply detailed in Part III B.1 of this paper. Contrary to the 
ruling, they demonstrate the necessity for the precise attention to context superbly 
exemplified by Judge Politz’s warning in Houston Oil & Minerals Corporation v. 
American International Tool Company, that “[w]e are not convinced that the term 
“vessel” for Jones Act purposes, which is subject to liberal construction consistent 
with the purposes of the Act, is necessarily a vessel for other purposes as well….”266 
 
The ruling’s second ground is that mobility lies at the root of the generic 
“vessel” concept. To hold that a mobile platform is not a “vessel,” the court states, 
runs “counter to longstanding case law which establishes conclusively that the 
Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit, was a vessel.”267  Combining 
this premise with the generic concept position, the court’s recourse to Dutra is 
inevitable in light of Dutra’s description of a “vessel” as “any watercraft practically 
capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of 
transit at a particular moment.” 268 Ignored are that Dutra is a non-OCS location case 
involving a non-OCS “operation,” as defined in OCSLA sec. 1333(a)(1). Hence, Dutra’s 
source for application of the “vessel” concept is general maritime law, not OCSLA 
sec. 1333(a)(1) and the OPA provisions outlined earlier.269 While the Deepwater 
Horizon’s mobility does indeed constitute it a MODU, moreover, the latter term is 
but a first step in the complex process described in Part IV.A. of determining 
whether the rig also qualifies as an OPA sec. 2701(37) “vessel,” a process the ruling 
ignores. 
 
The court’s ruling that the Macondo operation is substantially related to a 
traditional maritime activity disposes of this complex issue in a single conclusory 
sentence,270 buttressed by a citation to the Fifth Circuit’s Theriot v. Drilling Bay 
                                                        
263 Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).    
264 Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005). 
265 Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc. 280 F.3rd 492 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled in part 
on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3rd 778 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
266 827 F.2d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Houston 
Oil & Minerals Corp., 484 U.S. 1067 (1988). Houston Oil was a negligence and 
products liability action arising from the malfunction of a mud saver sub aboard an 
OCS mobile drilling rig. Among other cases cited by the court for its holding that 
OCSLA-endorsed state law applied are Executive Jet, id. at 1053; Foremost Ins. Co. v. 
Richardson, 457 U.S. 688 (1982); Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. 414 (1986); and  Sohyde 
Drilling Co. v. Coastal Gas Prod. Co., 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981).  
267 B1 Bundle at 5 (boldface as quoted). 
268 Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., Inc., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2009). 
269 See supra Part IV.A. 
270 The sentence, as it appears in in B1 Bundle at 8 declares: “Second, the operations 
of the DEEPWATER HORIZON bore a substantial relationship to traditional 
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Drilling Corporation decision.271 As a nisi prius court the Eastern District of Louisiana 
is accountable, of course, to and properly must take into account Fifth Circuit 
precedents. Despite the Fifth Circuit’s ample delineation of admiralty jurisdiction’s 
bounds,272 however, Theriot‘s citation as the authoritative precedent is ill-chosen 
even within the Circuit’s jurisprudence. Theriot’s oil drilling operation occurred in 
Galveston Bay, not on the OCS,273 and addressed a contract, not a tort issue.274 As a 
non-OCS event, of course, the operation is not subject to OCSLA’s coverage as 
detailed in Part II. C.-E., nor to the considerations bearing upon its status under 
Executive Jet/Grubart detailed in in Part IV.B. Framing a dispute as a contract rather 
than a tort action, moreover, biases the outcome in favor of admiralty jurisdiction.275 
Finally, predicating the ruling’s result on Theriot conflates Executive Jet/Grubart’s 
test’s location requirement with its separate requirement calling for an independent 
analysis of the underlying activity giving rise to the alleged admiralty tort.276 
 
The question whether the Macondo blowout is an admiralty tort taps deeply 
into the decades-long tension between the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court over 
OCSLA’s scope. The ultimate venue for its definitive resolution properly lies 
elsewhere than in the District Court, whichever outcome the latter might have 
preferred. Whether or not the Macondo MDL action will afford the occasion for the 
issue’s denoument remains to be seen. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
maritime activity. See Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corporation, 783 F.2d 527, 538-39 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (“oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to 
be maritime commerce”).” 
271 738 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1986) 
272 See examples cited supra note 256 supra. 
273 Id. at 530.   
274 Theriot addressed an indemnity contract for injuries incurred by the employees 
of their respective contractors. Id. at 538-40.  
275 See supra note 41. Theriot demonstrates as much in its declaration that 
“[w]hether a particular contract can be characterized as maritime depends on the 
nature and character of the contract, not on the situs of its performance and 
execution.” Id. at 538. 
276 See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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